By Kuldip Nayar
UNFORTUNATELY, both China and Pakistan have reacted adversely to the President Bush-Prime Minister Manmohan Singh nuclear agreement. There is nothing against them except their own anti-India perception. China has said that New Delhi should have been a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which Beijing itself has not signed. Pakistan wants the same type of nuclear deal which America has rejected firmly.
The first remark that President General Pervez Musharraf made after the agreement announcement from New Delhi was that China was Pakistan’s “strategical partner.” Probably, it is. But such phrases bring back the memories of the cold war. It would be dangerous to revive the same type of attitudes because they have cost the humanity more than 50 years of sterile policies, mistrust and fear, apart from several bush wars and the colossal wasteful armament race.
Musharraf’s irritation is not understandable because Pakistan continues to be America’s ally, the point which Bush underlined while in India. He applauded Pakistan’s role in fighting terrorists although he wanted it to do more. Some 120 terrorists were killed on the Waziristan-Afghanistan border within a few hours as if Bush had only to order and Islamabad was ready to deliver.
Musharraf has himself said in a television interview that he was “satisfied” with the outcome of Bush’s visit and that Pakistan’s needs were different from India’s. Manmohan Singh’s statement before parliament should have allayed any fears. This being the case, why can’t Delhi, Islamabad and, for that matter, Beijing develop a common understanding independent of Washington? All the three countries have the growth rate of more than eight per cent. All the three have millions of poor who are getting poorer day by day. All the three are natural partners because they have suffered at the hands of imperialism and have been able to free themselves on their own.
Worlds like the “strategical alliance” suggest some sort of confrontation. Alliance against whom? All the three have already waged wars against one another. India and China fought in 1962 and India and Pakistan in 1948, 1965 and 1971. What did they gain through hostilities? They had to sit across the table to sort out the same problems which had provoked them to go to war. They can decimate one another if anyone of them opts for war to settle the problems they face. There is no alternative to peace. They should have learnt the lesson by now.
Proximity between New Delhi and Washington does not mean alienation with Islamabad or Beijing. India and China are getting closer to each other and may well be signing an agreement on the border before long. Trade between the two countries is galloping and economic ties becoming stronger. New Delhi and Islamabad are processing confidence building measures even though haltingly.
On China, I know we are discussing “substantial” points on how to draw a permanent border. India seems to be willing to accept China’s claim over the Aksai Chin which New Delhi did not concede when Beijing vainly argued that the Aksai Chin was its only the link between Sinkiang and the rest of China. What is stalling the agreement, I am told, is Beijing’s insistence to have a foothold in Arunachal. (Its assembly speaker was never given a visa by China.)
I only hope that the Indo-US nuclear deal does not cast its shadow on further talks between New Delhi and Beijing. Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee has already postponed his visit to China. Probably, Beijing wants to know how far New Delhi has bought America’s thesis that India can be a counterweight to China. This is the thesis which the US administration proposes to sell to its Congress to get approval for the nuclear deal.
The counterweight theory is, however, far from the minds of India’s policy makers. But, ideologically, both are so apart that their interests may collide in South Asia someday. And the two “giants”, as Jawaharlal Nehru predicted, were bound to clash. America’s reading too is on these lines. But that clash has already taken place. Whether it can recur or not depends both on New Delhi and Beijing.
I am worried about the fallout on the India-Pakistan relations. The two are scheduled to meet later this month for talks. However, India’s equation with America will be at the back of Pakistan’s mind. Islamabad has been Washington’s close ally since the cold war days. There was a cooling off period but since the 9/11 Pakistan has been America’s dependable friend. Washington has been able to reach many Islamic countries through Islamabad. Why should it worry about America?
Pakistan is sore that it did not get the same nuclear status as India has. But Islamabad knew beforehand that Washington was only using the deal to reach New Delhi. American economic interests coincide with India’s needs. It is a big market, opening up. New Delhi may want to go slow but Washington’s pressure will be relentless, particularly when both reactors and fuel for civil nuclear energy are going to come from America.
Many years ago, a Pakistan foreign secretary told me that the way to reach Beijing was through Islamabad. Pakistan would do better if it were to go to New York through New Delhi. But India would first need to see that the training camps for the jehadis are dismantled and the ISI plan on infiltration is jettisoned as an option. Cross-border terrorism, even Bush was convinced at Delhi, remained one of the planks of Pakistan’s policy towards India.
Pakistan’s main concern must be Kashmir. America did not mention it even in the joint statement from Islamabad. Bush referred to it while replying to a question by a Pakistani journalist. Bush repeated the earlier stand that it was for the two countries to sort out the Kashmir problem, with America’s assistance, if required. For the religious parties the reply was such a disappointment that President Qazi Hussain of Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal said Musharraf’s request to Bush to help resolve the Kashmir issue was “a mistake” because America would never play a neutral role. If so, where does Islamabad go?
Both New Delhi and Islamabad after years of talks, open and secret, have found no meeting point. People-to-people contact has helped and there are now more channels to meet than before. However, Pakistan is not willing to have free trade before Kashmir is settled. This is a wrong approach because economic ties would have forged closer relations and created better atmosphere. Pakistan will be amazed to know how the opinion in India is veering round to a sort of autonomy provided the problem is settled once and for all. Since America has said ‘no’ to mediation again, Islamabad should come out of the box and present a solution which does not give the impression of Kashmir seceding from India.
(Originally published in the Kashmir Times on February 7, 2006)
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