Book: Azadi Kaay Baa’d
Language: Urdu
Author: Danish Irshad
Pages: 293
Price: 999 (PKR)
When travelling to the areas close to the Line of Control (LoC) in childhood in Jammu and Kashmir, one often looked at the land across the divided line with awe and mesmerism. Although there is hardly any similarity in terms of race or language between the various regions of the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir, the borders demarcated by the 1846 Amritsar Agreement have connected their fate together.
The Neelum and Muzaffarabad areas of Pakistan-administered Kashmir are adjacent to the districts of Kupwara and Baramulla in the Kashmir Valley. However, a major part of it, including Bagh, Plandri, Rawalakot, Kotli, Mirpur, and Bhimber, were parts of the Jammu division before 1947.
This state comprises many diverse ethnic groups like Kashmiri, Kargili, Ladakhi, Balti, Hunza, Kalasha, Chitrali, Potohari (Pahari), Dogra, Gujjar-Bakarwal Shina and others.
Unlike the relatively homogenous ethnic population of the Kashmir Valley, Pakistan-administered Kashmir has a diverse population comprising various communities or baradaris such as Mughals, Gujjars, Suddhans, Rajputs, Chauhans, and countless others. The majority there speak the Pahari language, which is closely related to Potohari and Hindko.
Kashmiri may be the dominant race across the state, but there are only 5% of the people who speak Kashmiri in Pakistan-administered Kashmir.
Since historically, socially, and politically, the Kashmir Valley has been regarded as the nucleus of the entire region, the dynamics, perspectives, and other aspects of the surrounding regions have often been overlooked by researchers.
While thousands of books and research papers have been written on the Kashmir Valley, very little attention has been given to Pakistan-administered Kashmir, which, before 1947, was essentially a remote, peripheral area of the region.
Bridging Academic Gap
This gap has recently been bridged by a young Rawalakot-based author and journalist, Danish Irshad.
His book, Azadi Kaay Baa’d (After Freedom) in racy Urdu language is an important piece of research on the political and social dynamics of this region.
The 293-page book comprehensively discusses a wide range of topics, including the establishment of the interim government, demands for democracy, unnecessary blunders by Pakistani rulers, the Indus Waters Treaty, the Mangla Dam, the current public rights movement, and many other subjects.
Ideally, both India and Pakistan should have competed to improve governance and uphold democratic traditions in their respective administered areas of Jammu and Kashmir, setting an example for South Asia. Instead, unfortunately, they have competed in stifling democratic institutions.
While political agents of the rulers in New Delhi were convinced that granting political rights to people would mean for them to lose clout and power, the book gives the impression that Pakistani rulers were no less behind. They also unnecessarily tried to suppress this region's democratic system.
Given that Pakistan had control over a smaller area, i.e., two and a half districts of Jammu and Kashmir as of 1947, it could have been transformed into a laboratory for democratic, economic, and social reforms, serving as a model for all of South Asia.
The author mentions the formation of an independent government under Ghulam Nabi Gilkar on 5th October 1947, an event that occurred before Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession, the arrival of Indian troops, and the tribal invasions.
According to the book, Gilkar even met Sheikh Abdullah in Srinagar, though the likelihood of such a meeting is slim. Unlike other political leaders, Sheikh Abdullah was released from jail but soon left for Delhi to participate in the All-India States People's Conference. Upon the recommendation of Congress and Jawaharlal Nehru, he was appointed president of the conference in his absence.
The book mentions the establishment of Radio Sada-e-Kashmir in the Pakistani part of Kashmir for launching propaganda. Although the author does not state this, an agreement was reached between the two countries immediately after Partition not to engage in propaganda against each other. This was later formalized in the Nehru-Liaquat Pact of 1950.
According to Rajesh Bhat, author of Radio Kashmir in Times of Peace and War, when India established a radio station in Srinagar in July 1948, it was named Radio Kashmir Srinagar instead of All India Radio or Akashvani. This had nothing to do with Kashmir's special status but was done to claim that it was not part of India's official institutions in case Pakistan accused it of propaganda and violating the agreement.
Earlier, for similar reasons, Pakistan had also set up the Sada-e-Kashmir radio station in April 1948, separate from Radio Pakistan.
Page 31 of the book mentions the arrival of Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas in Pakistan in 1948, noting that he tried to persuade Pakistan's Governor-General Muhammad Ali Jinnah to restore Jammu and Kashmir to its 15th August status. However, the Pakistani leadership rejected this proposal.
Chaudhry Abbas had been handed over to Pakistan in exchange of prisoners. His daughter had also been abducted during the communal riots in Jammu when he was in prison.
From time to time, many Pakistani scholars make claims about Kashmir that as per new documents and archival records now lack any historical basis.
India's position on Jammu and Kashmir is that the region became an integral part when Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession under the India Independence Act.
Pakistan, on the other hand, argues that according to the same Act, where the ruler and the population belonged to different religions, the opinion of the majority population should have been given priority.
The Indian cabinet under Nehru, while accepting the Instrument of Accession, had itself promised that after restoring law and order, the accession would be referred to by the people's vote. This was later reiterated by the United Nations in its various resolutions as well.
Nehru and Plebscite
However, the declassified archival records now suggest that Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru never intended to confirm the accession by referring it to the people through a plebiscite.
According to Ashok Parthasarathi, the son of Nehru's and Indira Gandhi's advisor G. Parthasarathi, Nehru had sent his grandfather, Sir Gopalaswami Ayyangar, to Srinagar on a confidential mission in July 1947 to convince the Maharaja to accede to India.
Ayyangar also served as the Maharaja's Prime Minister from 1937 to 1943. At the Srinagar airport, an Indian Air Force listening post was set up, from where messages were first sent to Patiala and then forwarded to Delhi, as there was no direct wireless service from Srinagar to Delhi at that time.
During these efforts, Home Minister Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel warned that retaining such a large population against their will could pose a perpetual threat to national security, but he later became a strong votary of annexing Kashmir. Nehru would argue that Kashmiris would remain content as long as their needs were met, though he was concerned about the reactions in the peripheral regions like Poonch, Mirpur, and Muzaffarabad.
While many criticise Nehru for declaring a ceasefire and not allowing the Indian Army to take over the entire Jammu and Kashmir, once at a seminar in Delhi Field Marshal General Manekshaw responded to this criticism, saying that an army can fight only another army, not the public. He pointed out that just as General K.S. Thimayya, in November 1948, deployed tanks to the high peaks of Zoji La to annex Kargil and Ladakh into India, similar advances could have been made beyond Uri, Kupwara, and Poonch.
Due to popular leader Sheikh Abdullah's support for Kashmir's accession to India, the army faced no public resistance in the Kashmir Valley. However, his influence did not extend beyond Uri or Poonch, where Indian forces would have faced the resistance and rebellious nature ofthe local population.
Hence, India secured the territory it needed in Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah had himself many times curtly mentioned that Jammu's Muslims (the area which is now a major part of Pakistan-administered Kashmir) had never accepted him as their leader.
Nine years before the Partition, in the Ahmedabad Fort where Nehru wrote "The Discovery of India," a close reading of the text reveals that he was emotionally attached to the Kashmir Valley and would have never allowed it to become part of Pakistan or remain independent.
In May 1948, when Indira Gandhi wrote to her father Nehru from Sonamarg, stating that "no one in Kashmir except Sheikh Abdullah is confident of winning a plebiscite in India's favour," Nehru responded that the promise was merely a ruse to check global opinion and held no real value.
He wrote that over time, as Kashmiris received ample food, they would resign to their fate. Without this promise, the United Nations Security Council might have passed a resolution under a different chapter, which could have necessitated military intervention. The existing UN resolution due to this ingenious approach did not include an "enforcement" clause because both parties had agreed to it.
The purpose of going into detail here is to highlight the necessity of examining new documents and revelations before analyzing and writing about these events.
Interesting Details in Book
Author Danish Irshad, referencing Ghazi Muhammad Afzal Khan, writes that Mirwaiz Molvi Muhammad Yusuf Shah, who also served as the President of Pakistan-administered Kashmir, wrote to Nehru, suggesting that merging Kashmir with India was the best option.
However, this claim needs further verification from independent sources. This letter is not present in Nehru's correspondence, now available in 100 volumes. However, these volumes include a 1948 letter from Maharaja Hari Singh, requesting the reversal of the accession.
The book covers many incidents I was unaware of, such as the internal conflicts between Sardar Ibrahim, Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas, and Sardar Abdul Qayyum in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, which turned the region into a battleground.
In 1950, a rebellion in Poonch against Sardar Ibrahim's dismissal escalated to the point where, during a siege of Ghazi Muhammad Amir's house, Pakistani troops had to surrender and retreat. These troops were later punished by General Ayub Khan. Similarly, a parallel government was formed in Bagh challenging Muzaffarabad.
Two years later, another rebellion erupted in Poonch under the leadership of Khan of Mang. After military action, the rebels crossed the ceasefire line, only returning two years later. Their demand was simply to grant people the right to vote.
In the Indian part of Jammu and Kashmir, voting rights were granted much earlier in the 1950s, but successive elections were marred with allegations of rigging to ensure the victory of favoured candidates. In Pakistan-administered Kashmir, adult suffrage was first introduced in 1970. However, in 1974, the parliamentary system was suspended.
The book, written in an interesting style, covers multiple events. For instance, it mentions how President Iskander Mirza incited Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas to create unrest in Kashmir to destabilize the government by conspiring against President Ibrahim Khan. For this purpose, the Kashmir Liberation Movement was initiated, and it was announced that the ceasefire line would be crossed to march toward Srinagar.
K H Khurshid’s Proposal
Similarly, it discusses the efforts during K.H. Khurshid’s presidency to have Pakistan-administered Kashmir recognized as the representative government of Kashmir.
The book claims that countries like China and Algeria were prepared to recognize it. However, the idea of recognizing a region consisting of just two and a half districts as an independent state seems implausible.
It is possible, though, that since the world over the government in Srinagar is recognized globally as the representative government of Kashmir, K.H. Khurshid might have attempted to have such recognition for Muzaffarabad.
However, with the nucleus of the region that is Kashmir Valley, lying on the Indian side, this effort seemed unlikely to succeed. Also, the seats in the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly are kept vacant for Pakistan-administered Kashmir, reinforcing its claim as the representative of undivided Jammu and Kashmir.
Khurshid’s step seems politically creative, as it could have given members of the Pakistan-administered Kashmir Assembly recognition as representatives of the entire Kashmir populace.
For a brief time, the American administration maintained a soft stance towards the idea of an independent Jammu and Kashmir state. However, according to recently declassified documents from the US State Department, this stance was soon firmly opposed.
In 1950, a memo to the Secretary of State explicitly stated, “An independent Kashmir would likely fall into communist hands.” A 1956 telegram mentioned that “nothing short of war would force the Indian government to abandon Kashmir.”
Water Issues
The book also delves extensively into water-related issues. It laments that both sides of Kashmir’s governments were not consulted before signing the Indus Water Treaty. However, even if consultations had occurred, no other agreement would have been possible.
Geography makes it impossible for India to utilize water from the Indus, Chenab, and Jhelum rivers. These negotiations were mediated by the World Bank. The densely populated Kashmir Valley sits at an average elevation of 1,850 meters above sea level, surrounded by the Pir Panjal mountains, with an average height of 5,000 meters. Therefore, water could neither be stored nor diverted for use elsewhere and had to continue flowing into Pakistan.
If the Kashmir issue had not arisen, there might have been no need to construct the Mangla Dam near Mirpur. Water could have been stored by enclosing Wular Lake instead. In the early 20th century, the Punjab government had first proposed building a barrage on Wular Lake to the Maharaja.
Since 80% of irrigation water for Pakistan’s agriculture comes from rivers originating in Kashmir, the beneficiaries should bear responsibility for maintaining these water sources and addressing the needs of the populations living in these regions. It is essential to meet the energy needs of the communities living in mountains who act as custodians of these rivers.
While it is true that thousands of megawatts of electricity can be generated from these rivers, the question remains: who will bear the cost of constructing these projects? Those who fund the construction naturally become stakeholders in the electricity generated.
It is a fact that people living in different parts of the state face distinct challenges and hold varying views regarding its political future. The majority of the population in the Kashmir Valley remains eager for connectivity with the outside world.
In 2015, when a delegation of journalists from Srinagar, led by the late Shujaat Bukhari, visited Muzaffarabad for the first time, what moved and impacted them the most was a signboard at the confluence of the Neelum and Jhelum rivers. The board read, “Srinagar 179 km, Tashkent 578 km, Kabul 393 km.” They saw the road their ancestors once used for connectivity. The signboard, symbolic as it may be, evoked strong emotions within the group.
Beneath these emotions lay the pain of how, half a century ago, a region that was interconnected with the entire world and served as a bridge between South Asia and Central Asia, suddenly became a vast prison in the 20th century. Now, instead of welcoming trade caravans, the region quakes under the boots of soldiers.
Idea of Kashmir
Residents of Pakistan-administered Kashmir also identify themselves as Kashmiris, benefiting from privileges in various countries under this name. However, they tend to distance themselves during times of trial.
On the other hand, Kashmiri leaders from the Valley also maintain a distance from them. Even within the Hurriyat Conference, no faction from Pakistan-administered Kashmir or any political party from the region has ever been granted representation.
Mainstream political parties on both sides suspended their activities in the other region after 1947. The National Conference closed its chapters in Muzaffarabad and Mirpur, while the Muslim Conference bid farewell to the Valley and Jammu. They could have kept their presence and played the roles of opposition in territories, where the rival was the dominant political force.
The National Conference, when in power did not have any credible opposition on the Indian side, so this was true for the Muslim Conference on the other side. Leaders of the Muslim Conference in Kashmir Valley left to seek political ground in Pakistani-administered Kashmir.
When Khawja Sanaulla Shamim in Sopore left for Muzaffarabad, there was none to challenge National Conference stalwart Sofi Mohammad Akbar, who in those days, used to confiscate radios, if someone tunes Pakistan or Sada e Kashmir radion station. He becamea votary of Independent Kashmir post 1975.
A major question arises: While the rest of India has successfully formulated an “idea of India” despite its diverse population, why have not the leaders or people of undivided Jammu and Kashmir been able to establish an “idea of Kashmir”?
Such an idea could accommodate the interests of every region and ethnicity, or at least create a shared agenda. However, without a towering leader, this seems unlikely.
Nonetheless, Danish Irshad’s book serves as a document for understanding the dynamics of Pakistan-administered Kashmir.
It is hoped that future editions will objectively explore other issues in greater detail. Romanticizing an ideology is not inherently bad, but turning it into fantasy can be fatal for a researcher.
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