NEW DELHI: Former Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh, who passed away on December 26, led India through a crucial decade of economic growth and transformation from 2004 to 2014, has passed away. Dr. Singh, who was often described as the architect of India's economic reforms in the 1990s, leaves behind a legacy that transformed India's political and economic landscape.
He also leaves behind a complex legacy of ambitious peace initiatives with Pakistan, particularly his vision for resolving the Kashmir dispute.
Dr. Singh worked tirelessly behind the scenes to craft what came to be known as the "Manmohan-Musharraf formula" - a four-step roadmap that could have potentially transformed the Indo-Pak relationship.
The Four-Step Peace Formula
The groundbreaking peace framework, developed through back-channel diplomacy between 2004 and 2007, consisted of four key elements. These included making the Line of Control (LoC) "just a line on a map" by facilitating free movement and trade across borders, strengthening local self-government on both sides of the LoC, creating joint institutions under Kashmiri leadership for coordinating policies on matters of common interest, and gradual and mutual troop withdrawal once peace was established.
Bold Initiatives Amid Terror Threats
Dr. Singh's commitment to peace was perhaps most evident in April 2005, when he refused to cancel his visit to Srinagar despite a terrorist attack on the state tourism office just a day before. The visit was meant to inaugurate the historic Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service - a confidence-building measure that embodied his vision of making borders "irrelevant."
"This is the first step on the long road of peace," Singh had declared in Srinagar, demonstrating remarkable political courage that earned him goodwill both within Kashmir and across India.
The Back Channel Diplomacy
A crucial aspect of Singh's peace efforts was the sophisticated back-channel diplomacy conducted through Special Envoy Satinder Lamba, who held secret meetings with his Pakistani counterpart Tariq Aziz. These discussions, often held in third countries like Dubai, helped develop the framework agreement that Singh hoped to sign with then-Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf.
The Havana Breakthrough
A significant moment came during the 2006 Havana meeting between Singh and Musharraf, where they agreed to establish a joint anti-terrorism institutional mechanism - a bold move that faced considerable criticism at home. The meeting was notable for an unprecedented hour-long private conversation between the two leaders, excluding even their closest advisers.
The Peace Treaty That Never Was
As revealed in "The Accidental Prime Minister" by his former media advisor Sanjay Baru, in December 2006, Singh made his boldest move yet - proposing a Treaty of Peace, Security and Friendship with Pakistan. Speaking in Amritsar, he said, "I earnestly hope that the relations between our two countries become so friendly and that we generate such an atmosphere of trust between each other that the two nations would be able to agree on a Treaty."
Vision of a New Kashmir
In a landmark speech at Kashmir's Medical Sciences Institute in 2004, Singh had spoken of his vision for a "Naya Kashmir" (new Kashmir), proposing a "new blueprint" for the region. He later expanded on this vision in Amritsar in 2006, speaking in Punjabi for audiences across the border in Lahore: "Borders cannot be redrawn but we can work towards making them irrelevant - towards making them just lines on a map." His initiative led to the holding of several Round Table Conferences on Kashmir.
Round Table Conference
In 2006, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh took a significant step by establishing five working groups on Jammu and Kashmir. The main goal was to usher in development and create conditions for permanent peace in the troubled state.
The initiative unfolded with four of the five Working Groups submitting their reports in 2007, followed by the Third Round Table Conference in April 2007. During this conference, there was broad consensus on implementing the Working Groups' recommendations on wide ranging issues human rights, refugee issues, confidence building measures, cross-LoC relations, economic development, good governance and centre-state relations.
Despite these comprehensive initiatives and recommendations, the implementation remained slow, with only a few recommendations being acted upon till the peace process began to crumble after 2008.
The Unfinished Legacy
The assassination of Benazir Bhutto in 2007 and Musharraf's subsequent political troubles effectively ended the momentum of these peace initiatives. The 2008 Mumbai terror attacks further complicated the dialogue process. Though Singh attempted to revive the peace process during his second term, particularly at the 2009 Sharm el-Sheikh meeting with Prime Minister Gilani, domestic political challenges prevented significant progress.
Baru's book reveals that not completing this peace process remained one of Singh's greatest regrets. However, his vision and the framework he developed with Musharraf continues to be seen by many as the most practical blueprint for eventual peace between the two nations.
Excerpts from Sanjay Baru’s ‘The Accidental Prime Minister’:
In November 2004, Dr Singh was to make his first official visit to Jammu and Kashmir. He had returned from New York in September 2004 after a useful meeting with President Musharraf and felt the time was ripe for a new initiative on Kashmir.
Addressing the students and faculty of the Kashmir Institute of Medical Sciences, he spoke of his vision of a new Kashmir (Naya Kashmir) and said that the time has come to put forward a new blueprint, a fresh vision for Kashmir and for the Kashmiri people, free from the fear of war, want and exploitation.
The opening up of the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service was a major confidence-building exercise that unfolded the PMs vision of a Naya Kashmir. A key idea was free travel across the so-called Line of Control. But, despite this initiative, Dr Singh was not able to make a breakthrough with the Hurriyat and the separatists in Kashmir.
He needed an instrument through which he could open an internal dialogue, just as he had by then opened dialogue with Musharraf. I was not aware what view Narayanan was taking of Dr Singh’s ideas about a Naya Kashmir and a new blueprint until I was summoned by the PM sometime in August 2005 and asked who I thought were the wise men he should consult on Kashmir. He was then preparing for his third meeting with Musharraf in September 2005.
I recalled the fact that when I was editor of the Financial Express, I had once met Dr Singh at the home of journalist Prem Shankar Jha in Delhi’s Golf Links where Prem and my former colleague from the Economic Times David Devadas had brought together some Hurriyat leaders for a conversation over very high-quality Kashmiri Wazwan. So, I first suggested Prem’s name and then went on to add the names of all those who I knew had either some knowledge or interest in the subject.
This list included strategic affairs guru K. Subrahmanyam, former home secretary and the government’s special representative on J &K N.N. Vohra, journalists B.G. Verghese, Manoj Joshi (who had published a book on Kashmir) and Bharat Bhushan, Kashmiri economist Haseeb Drabhu, who was then adviser to the chief minister of J&K, and Amitabh Mattoo.
Dr Singh asked me to arrange a meeting with all of them. It was decided that they would all be invited for a pre-lunch meeting on a Saturday morning and the conversation would carry on overlunch.
Narayanan was miffed at the idea. “Why does he want all these seminar-wallahs here? he asked. What can they tell him that we do not already know?”
I said there was no harm in the PM hearing opinions from outside the government.
“He reads all their columns anyway!” replied an exasperated and irritated Narayanan.
Later, he sat glumly through the meeting. As he left, he asked me if I had heard one new idea. Not being a subject expert, I was not sure how much of what had been said that morning was new. But I soon realized there was a major takeaway from the meeting when Dr Singh called me and said he liked K. Subrahmanyam’s suggestion that the PM should convene a roundtable on the future of J&K, ensuring that every single viewpoint was represented around the table.
That is what the British did, he added for effect. Narayanan was uncomfortable with the term round-table conference for precisely that reason. As he pointed out, the British had convened a round-table conference to begin the process of granting India independence. Was that the political message the PM wanted to send? Narayanan did not like the idea at all.
Dr Singh had a different view. He believed the time had come for everyone in the state to freely express their opinion. After all, the Hurriyat and separatists did not represent the majority in the state, nor was azadi really on the cards. The separatists were a vocal and an important minority. Let them speak openly in a gathering of fellow Kashmiris and representatives of Jammu and Ladakh, he felt, and let there be an open discussion. In the end it would have to be India and Pakistan that would have to arrive at a settlement of the issue, keeping in mind the welfare of the Kashmiri people.
Invitations were sent out to every political party, to intellectuals, heads of major academic institutions, NGOs and to the Kashmiri separatists as well. On 25 February 2006, after Parliament had opened for the budget session, the First J&K Roundtable was convened at 7 RCR. Invitations to the meeting were handed over personally to every important leader from the state.
Intelligence officials scouted out even those who were ostensibly underground and letters of invitation were personally handed over to them. No one could claim he or she was not invited. The roundtable was a great success inasmuch as it was the first dialogue process of its kind and allowed a wide cross-section of opinion to be freely expressed. The Hurriyat boycotted the meeting, but they seemed impressed by the PM’s sincerity, because soon after, they agreed to meet him for a direct dialogue.
He opened the day-long round- table saying: “A round-table is a dialogue. No one preaches and no one just listens. This is a dialogue of equals who promise to work together. Today’s meeting is a significant event. It will, however, achieve historical importance if we are able to unleash a process by which we can arrive at a workable blueprint that can help to create a new chapter in Kashmir’s history. Not by compromising on one’s ideals, but in a spirit of mutual tolerance, understanding and accommodation.”
Excerpts from Sanjay Baru’s book, “The Accidental Prime Minister”.
Pakistan relations and the need to find a lasting solution to the problem of Jammu and Kashmir, had occupied Dr Singhs attention for years. His interest in it predated his prime ministership and he kept himself informed on what was happening in J&K. So it was not surprising that while preparing for his first visit as PM to the UN General Assembly, in September 2004, Dr Singh devoted considerable time to his planned meeting with President Pervez Musharraf.
To create a favourable environment for the meeting, India took the initiative to announce unilateral liberalization of the visa regime for Pakistani academics, businessmen and senior citizens. That some back- channel discussions had already taken place on Kashmir was evident from the fact that President Musharraf made no reference to the troubled issue in his speech.
Singh reciprocated the gesture by telling the UN General Assembly that he reaffirmed India’s determination to carry forward the dialogue with Pakistan initiated by his predecessor, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, in January 2004, to a purposeful and mutually acceptable conclusion. Those statements set the tone for the meeting of the two leaders at New York’s Roosevelt Hotel on 24 September 2004.
While Dr Singh drove to the hotel with a delegation that included External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh, the two leaders chose to meet without aides and talked for over an hour. Earlier it had been decided that the two would not meet the media and only a spokesperson would brief journalists. But as the meeting came to an end, they announced that they would like to jointly address the media.
Almost fifty to sixty waiting journalists from both countries had to be security checked and allowed into the hotel lobby within minutes. The hotel did not have a suitable conference room, so it was decided that the two leaders would stand in a wide corridor outside the room where they met and make a statement.
As TV crews set up their cameras, it was left to MEA spokesperson Navtej Sarna to get a hotel staffer to unscrew the Exit sign on the wall so that the two leaders would not be caught on camera standing below it. The two then issued a bland joint statement, hurriedly drafted by their aides, that said they had agreed that confidence-building measures of all categories under discussion between the two governments should be implemented keeping in mind practical possibilities. It became clear that the two had a more wide-ranging conversation.
About a month after Musharraf returned home, the Pakistan correspondent of the Tribune reported from Islamabad, on 27 October 2004, that, “in a new formulation to resolve the vexed Kashmir issue, President Pervez Musharraf last night suggested that India and Pakistan consider the option of identifying some regions of Kashmir on both sides of Line of Control, demilitarize them and grant them the status of independence or joint control or under UN mandate.” The report quoted Pakistan’s government-run TV channel, PTV, to say that Musharraf had said that a solution to the lingering Kashmir problem cannot be found either by insisting on plebiscite or making the LoC (Line of Control) into a permanent border.
Even though the Indian government rejected this interpretation of the New York conversation, it encouraged a public debate on the pros and cons of Musharraf’s thinking. After all, the idea was originally canvassed by none other than Dr Singh.
On the eve of his becoming prime minister, in May 2004, Dr Singh told journalist Jonathan Power (Statesman, 20 May 2004) in an off-the-record conversation that Power published without his permission, Short of secession, short of redrawing boundaries, the Indian establishment can live with anything. Meanwhile, we need soft borders then borders are not so important.
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