The Way Forward in Kashmir is Talking to all Leaders Across Spectrum: A S Dulat

Whenever something of this scale happens — whether in Kashmir, elsewhere in the country, or even abroad — it invariably points towards a lapse in intelligence.

So yes, there was certainly an intelligence failure. There was also a breakdown in security. And you mentioned operational fatigue — that’s an interesting point. We often don’t acknowledge it, but fatigue is a very real factor in a conflict that has dragged on for decades. We’ve been managing the Kashmir issue for a long time now, and that weariness can lead to oversight.

This attack, in my view, was among the worst I’ve seen — brutal and senseless. What makes it all the more tragic is the targeting of innocent tourists. And if what we’re hearing is true, that they were attacked based on their religion, then it’s even more disturbing. 

Let me begin with Prime Minister Modi’s position domestically. For the average Indian, he comes across as a decisive and bold leader — someone who promised to retaliate and did exactly that. So, from a domestic political perspective, Modi’s stature has been reinforced.

Now, turning to India-Pakistan relations — everyone familiar with the dynamics of the subcontinent, knows that a prolonged conflict between the two countries is unsustainable. A full-blown war would be disastrous for both sides.

What we witnessed was a limited and targeted response from India, primarily aimed at terror infrastructure. That mission was accomplished, and as expected, Pakistan responded in kind.

The ceasefire that followed — mediated in part by (US) President Trump — brought a quick halt to escalation. Such external influence may seem significant in the moment, but in reality, these interventions are often about containing volatility rather than changing long-term geopolitical equations. Neither country wanted to be drawn into a wider conflict, and this ceasefire was the simplest way out.

As for India’s broader foreign policy, we’ll have to take a longer view. Broadly, our foreign policy has been on solid footing. That said, you raised an important point about Kashmir.

From years of watching Kashmir closely, I can say that something quite remarkable happened after the Pahalgam attack — something we haven’t seen in a long time. The Kashmiri people and a wide spectrum of Kashmiri leadership came out in strong support of Delhi. It was a moment of unity and solidarity that should have been capitalised on.

Unfortunately, we didn’t seize that opportunity. We let it pass without follow-up. In my opinion, that was a missed chance — a significant one — to build lasting trust and truly bring Kashmiris closer to the national mainstream.

No, I don’t think there’s anything fundamentally wrong with our intelligence doctrine. It doesn’t need a recaliberation. Mistakes do happen — they happen all over the world. Just look at what happened during 9/11 in the United States.

The truth is, no system is entirely foolproof. There's no such thing as perfect intelligence, just as there’s no such thing as absolute security. Despite our best efforts, incidents will occur from time to time. What matters is how we respond, how we learn, and how we continue to adapt. But a complete overhaul? That’s not necessary.

No, I don't think silence is necessarily a good thing in Kashmir. I’ve always believed that, regardless of whether we engage with Pakistan or not — and that takes us into the realm of diplomacy — we must always keep talking to Kashmir and to the Kashmiris. That line of communication should never be closed.

As I mentioned earlier, there was a moment when all of Kashmir seemed to be with us — when Kashmiris across the spectrum were supporting us. That was a moment we should have capitalized on, but we let it slip by.

Even now, with a National Conference government in place, we must continue to engage — speak with Omar Abdullah and the National Conference. And not just them — we should also be engaging with Mehbooba Mufti, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, and anyone else who matters in Kashmir.

Whoever the leadership is, whoever the people listen to — we must talk to them. That’s the only way forward.

I don't think it's about fear. It's more about personal choice. Some people like to speak, and some prefer to stay silent. As for me, I've chosen to speak—whether through interviews or writing books—and I don't see any harm in it.

Of course, once you speak or write, you're open to criticism, and I accept that. When I publish a book or express an opinion, I know not everyone will agree. If Delhi feels my view is not aligned with theirs, they’re free to criticise it—and that’s absolutely fair.

But I do have views, and I believe it's important to share them. As I've said before, and I’ll say it again for you: we should always remain in dialogue with the Kashmiri leadership. That conversation must never stop.

On the happiness of Kashmir. That should be at the core of our engagement—understanding what Kashmiris want, what they feel, and how we can ensure peace and dignity in their lives.

I’ve always felt that the ISI had a certain edge over RAW because of the autonomy it enjoys. Their operational freedom does allow them to move faster at times.

But that said, autonomy doesn't necessarily translate into superiority. In The Spy Chronicles, General Asad Durrani himself acknowledges that Indian intelligence agencies are better—he doesn’t name RAW directly, but he makes it clear.

We’re not weaker than the ISI. In fact, I believe we are professionally superior. And when a seasoned Pakistani general like Durrani supports that view, it certainly means something.

No, I wouldn’t say that RAW’s caution is a liability. The core difference lies in the institutional culture, as you rightly pointed out.

The ISI is a military organization—controlled entirely by the Pakistani military—so it enjoys much more operational autonomy and far less accountability.

In contrast, we operate within a democratic framework. Nothing here is beyond oversight or outside control. As RAW chief, I couldn’t simply decide to throw a bomb in Karachi—or anywhere else for that matter. That’s not how it works. Any use of force, any covert action, must have political sanction.

These are not decisions taken independently by the intelligence leadership. Our system requires legitimacy and accountability, and that’s how it should be.

No, I don’t agree with that. I believe that, on the ground, we’ve been just as effective as they have. Let me explain the real difference—it’s most visible in Kashmir.

The ISI has never hesitated to eliminate those who diverged from their line. Whether it was Mirwaiz Maulvi Farooq or others, if someone didn’t align with them, they were taken out. That’s how they operate.

RAW, on the other hand, has never followed that path. There were voices suggesting we should eliminate someone like Syed Ali Shah Geelani—but we never did that. That’s not how we function. Our approach, even in difficult situations, has remained within certain ethical boundaries.

Pakistan has lost the game in Kashmir. If the ISI ever manages to return or regain influence in the Valley, it would only be because of our own mistakes.

Pakistan has now become the fallback option in Kashmir—something people might turn to only when they feel ignored or alienated by us. That’s why I keep stressing the importance of engagement. We must engage with Kashmir continuously and meaningfully.

A Kashmiri should never feel neglected or left out of the national discourse. More than anything else, Kashmiris speak of dignity. And when I talk about dignity, I often use the word happiness instead. Because ultimately, a Kashmiri wants to live with India—but with happiness, not under compulsion or pressure.

I don’t believe it compromised national security—but of course, others may have a different view. Perspectives on this issue can vary, and I’ve never claimed to be the final authority on Kashmir.

What I can say is that this approach reflected my understanding of the situation, and more importantly, it aligned with Prime Minister Vajpayee’s vision. I served under him, and he believed in dialogue, inclusion, and reaching out—even to those who disagreed with us. That was the guiding principle.

There have been ups and downs in this regard. At times, there were discussions and good intentions, but we’ve struggled with consistency and follow-through.

For example, when Omar Abdullah was the Chief Minister after 2008, there were serious conversations around rehabilitation—about giving a second chance to those young men who had taken the wrong path, either by mistake or due to circumstance. The idea was to bring them back. Omar Abdullah talked about it quite openly.

But unfortunately, those initiatives never fully materialized. It's similar to the long-pending issue of the return of Kashmiri Pandits. That too remains incomplete.

Both rehabilitation of misguided youth and the return of Pandits are critical parts of any genuine and holistic counterinsurgency doctrine—but someone has to take ownership and see them through.

No, I don’t agree with that. I believe the agencies are doing what they are meant to do. Whether they are more active or less visible at times depends on the political leadership of the day—but that doesn't mean their core mandate has been compromised.

As far as Prime Minister Modi is concerned, I’ve seen him as someone who strongly supports the intelligence agencies. He has always stood by them. I have never seen him undermining or interfering in their work.

Take the incident in Pahalgam, for instance. Despite the seriousness of the situation, Modi Ji didn’t blame the agency. His approach has consistently reflected confidence and trust in their capabilities. In my view, the agencies continue to do their job, and they enjoy full backing from the Prime Minister.

As far as India is concerned, the Kashmir issue is a closed chapter internationally. There's no room for external mediation—this has been India’s consistent position since the days of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.

Remember the Simla Agreement of 1972? It clearly stated that any discussion on Kashmir will be bilateral—between India and Pakistan alone. No third party has any role to play.

So, if President Trump says he wants to mediate, that’s his prerogative—but it can’t happen unless Prime Minister Modi agrees. Mediation requires mutual consent, and India has never agreed to such intervention.

Our national leadership across parties—from Indira Gandhi to the present—has upheld this principle without exception. Focus should be on the happiness of Kashmir.

The key to peace lies not in Washington or Islamabad, but in continued engagement between Delhi and Srinagar. We must never stop talking to Kashmir. Engagement is critical. If Omar Abdullah is the Chief Minister, then Delhi must ensure he feels supported. And to be fair, Omar has always tried to maintain that bridge—doing his part to keep Delhi reassured and happy. That relationship, that communication, must never break.

Ultimately, the heart of the issue is trust, dignity, and dialogue with Kashmiris. That’s where the real work lies—not in international corridors, but on the ground, with our own people.

The reality is that Kashmir can change overnight. It can change from good to bad and from bad to good also. This has been the epicenter of India. The idea of India springs from Kashmir. 

Let me be honest—this book was written for Dr. Farooq Abdullah. It is a tribute to him, an appreciation of the man. I’ve never claimed that it's a purely objective account of his life or politics.

I have always had a soft corner for Dr. Farooq—not just for him personally, but also for the Abdullah family and the National Conference. That bias is well known and not something I’ve hidden.

This book wasn’t written at the behest of the PMO or any political establishment. It was written because I deeply admire Dr. Farooq Abdullah—as a leader and as a human being. In fact, someone jokingly told me that if this book were translated into Hindi, it could be titled Prem Kahani—a love story. And in some ways, that’s what it is: a heartfelt acknowledgment of a remarkable man I’ve respected for a long time.

So yes, the affection is personal. But there is no professional or publishing affiliation—just admiration, plain and simple.

I think it is definitely a success — when we talk of intelligence failures, this is quite the opposite; this is an intelligence success. It’s a great success of Indian intelligence. It is a clear-cut case of deep, long-term strategic success.

Let me also share something — I had anticipated this almost two years ago. It might have sounded silly or far-fetched at the time, but I had a strong sense that the Jamaat would shift its support from the PDP to the National Conference this time.

Traditionally, the Jamaat has aligned with the PDP — Mufti Sahib and later Mehbooba Mufti were supported by them in earlier elections. But this time, I have no doubt in my mind that their support went to the National Conference — and that’s a good thing.

It’s good for the Jamaat. It’s good for the Valley. And, more importantly, it’s a success for our intelligence agencies — who have quietly worked over the years towards mainstreaming these elements.

If the Jamaat is indeed entering the mainstream, it’s a very positive development going forward.

But I must add — and I’ve always said this — silence in Kashmir is not necessarily a good sign. Silence in Kashmir is dangerous. Real peace comes through engagement, not suppression.

Certainly, Jamaat-e-Islami’s entry into mainstream politics will help normalise the situation in Kashmir.

Look, the ultimate goal is to bring everyone into the mainstream.  Take Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, for example. I’ve been observing him for a long time, and I do believe he has been mainstreamed already. He’s been coming to Delhi. He comes and goes, and comes and goes. And yet, we aren’t doing enough.

We should be engaging with him far more than we are. And frankly, if Asaduddin Owaisi is Mirwaiz's closest confidante today, then I’d say we’re not moving in the right direction. You understand what I’m saying. Mirwaiz is a moderate voice, a religious leader, and we need to ensure that he feels he has a stake in the democratic process.

That, of course, depends entirely on Delhi. I can't predict or decide that. Now, it’s up to Delhi to evaluate whether continuing the ban still serves any purpose.

Let me remind you of an episode from the past — when Mufti Mohammad Sayeed was the Chief Minister. At the time, Syed Ali Shah Geelani used to make a lot of provocative statements. There was a moment when Delhi wanted Geelani Sahib to be locked up.

I personally spoke to Mufti Sahib about it, and he said something very wise — “No, I won’t lock him up. If I do, I’ll make him a martyr. We can deal with him without sending him to jail.” And Mufti Sahib was absolutely right.

These things require patience, wisdom, and a long-term vision. That’s how you truly shape the security landscape — not just through force, but through strategy, engagement, and inclusion.

I think the larger Jamaat constituency will ultimately feel betrayed by the present postures of a few of its people who are leading the change, ostensibly with the connivance of the State.

They will revolt and throw away this lot or will drift towards a more radical path.

My suggestion to New Delhi would be to walk a proper balance with respect to Jamaat. Don't fall for short term results. I would rather suggest adopting a long-term strategy where Jamaat constituency is transformed gradually without creating a religious vacuum in the valley. Any such vacuum is sure to be filled by more radical and diverse elements.

If the Jamaat-e-Islami is becoming mainstream, then that is an extremely positive development. What could be better for Kashmir and for India?

Let me take you back to 2000, when the Hurriyat Conference split and Syed Ali Shah Geelani walked out.

At the time, people often asked me—why is Geelani so pro-Pakistan? I used to say, it’s because Geelani never believed he could become the Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir. But if someone had given him a credible assurance — “Yes, you can be Chief Minister” — he would have come into the mainstream without hesitation.

Today, politics in Kashmir has evolved. I’ve said this before, and I’ll say it again—Mirwaiz Umar Farooq has the potential to become the Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir. He is young, he carries religious legitimacy, he has a dedicated following—not just in Kashmir or India, but even internationally. That makes him a significant figure in the region’s political future.

Back in 1986, we had the “Double Farooq Accord” between Rajiv Gandhi and Farooq Abdullah. So I ask, why can't there be a “Double Omar Accord” now—perhaps between Mirwaiz Umar Farooq and Omar Abdullah? Whether either of them would be open to the idea is another question, but it is certainly worth serious consideration.

As for Jamaat-e-Islami, their participation in elections and support for mainstream parties—especially the National Conference—is a major achievement for Indian intelligence. In the recent elections, their support helped the National Conference secure 42 seats across districts. If Jamaat had not supported the National Conference, it would not have won 42 seats.

From every region, in every district, Jamaat people came out and voted for NC. That cannot happen without ground-level shifts, and Jamaat was playing behind-the-scenes but playing a significant role.

So yes, if Jamaat has come into the democratic fold, we must not push them out. We must embrace that change and build on it. Because the future of Kashmir lies in inclusion, not alienation.