From Promise to Paralysis

On April 3, 2025, the Indian Parliament passed the Waqf (Amendment) Bill, 2025. In what has been termed as an attack on the Constitution and religious freedom, the Amendment Act was opposed by various Muslim groups and opposition parties alike. A few states passed resolutions against the Act and demanded its withdrawal.

The mainstream political parties of Jammu and Kashmir also signalled their opposition to the Act and expected the current government led by the National Conference (NC) to pass a resolution opposing the Act. However, the speaker of the Assembly disallowed a debate on the resolution, thereby giving rise to speculations regarding a sub rosa understanding between the centre and the NC.

On the same day, Chief Minister Omar Abdullah chose to get photographed with Kiren Rijiju, a Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) MP and minister responsible for moving the Bill, at Srinagar's famed Tulip Garden. The release of pictures exacerbated the feeling and provoked a furore among the opposition leaders.

For quite a while, the opposition had been contesting the Union Territory (UT) government on what they see as a capitulation of the NC before the Union government. The opposition alleges that the NC has implicitly accepted the new status quo established by the BJP.

Even though the NC made promises of Article 370 return and statehood restoration, among many other tall orders during election campaign, the grand old party of Jammu and Kashmir appears to have succumbed in front of the BJP.

The opposition clearly has an axe to grind, but their criticism holds considerable merit.

The Decisive Electoral Victory

The elections in the UT were held in October last year after a gap of ten years and the first since the revocation of its semi-autonomous status, ending six years of rule by the centre.

NC and its alliance partners garnered 49 seats, giving them a clear majority to form the government. In stark contrast, the People's Democratic Party (PDP) could only manage to retain 3 seats, a sharp decline from the 28 it had won in 2014.

After a slew of big-name defections and erosion of credibility in the valley – due to its alliance with the BJP in 2014 – the party suffered a historic drubbing. Even its political scion, Iltija Mufti, could not secure a win in the party's traditional stronghold.

The BJP won 29 seats, all of them from the Jammu region and its proxies drew a blank in the valley. These election results once again underscored the enduring political divide between the two provinces of Jammu and Kashmir.

NC centred its election campaign around the issues of identity and dignity, vowing to contest the unilateral actions of the union government. In its manifesto, the NC pledged to make every effort to restore the autonomy of Jammu and Kashmir as promised by the Constitution of India.

The party's rhetoric on autonomy resonated with the disgruntled electorate, propelling it to a sweeping victory. Moreover, the electoral verdict reflected two key sentiments: firstly, the NC remains the foremost flag bearer of Kashmiri identity, and secondly, the people entrusted it with the task of reclaiming lost autonomy, even if the prospect looks highly unlikely.

Backtracking on Promises

Contrary to the expectations generated by its election campaign, the National Conference has backtracked from its promises. Instead of opening and sustaining a discourse on autonomy or the restoration of Article 370, the party has restricted its demand to statehood, which normalises the unilateral abrogation of Article 370.

Even the symbolic cabinet resolution meant to challenge the unilateral dismantling of the ‘special status’ lacked clarity and did not explicitly refer to the drastic changes brought about by the BJP. Waheed Para, a PDP MLA and one of the government's fiercest critics called the resolution a “ratification of the August 5th, 2019 decision.”

Worse still, the Department of Information, J&K, circulated the resolution only two days after its adoption, following mounting pressure from the opposition.

In addition, the NC government has failed to restore the public holidays of Martyrs’ Day and Sheikh Abdullah’s birth anniversary. It has also been unsuccessful in preventing the arbitrary dismissal of government employees by the orders of the Lieutenant Governor (LG), making it clear that the Omar-led government is a mere rubber stamp with substantive power exercised by the LG-led bureaucratic complex.

The unwillingness to confront the LG on administrative issues such as these is telling of the NC’s growing bonhomie with the Modi government.

Critics have argued that after securing an electoral victory, the NC should have stood firm against New Delhi and mobilised public support to seek the restoration of the special status.

Political Expediency

However, the NC has been extremely risk-averse and unwilling to tread along this path. There is extensive political science literature that deals with the phenomenon of political parties mobilising masses when out of power, only to demobilise their support base when voted into office.

In his study of Latin American populism, Harvard-based political scientist Steven Levitsky has instructively discussed how political parties with populist tendencies mobilise mass support during electoral campaigns through anti-establishment appeals. Once they form the government, these parties tend to demobilise their base and prioritise consolidating power over the interests of their supporters.

Additionally, NC’s sobering experience with the Plebiscite Movement and its sudden disbandment could dissuade it from employing such a strategy.

The actions of today's NC are not without precedent, and the party appears to be drawing from a familiar script – contesting the union government when out of power and capitulating to it when in power. The NC’s conduct has been driven by political expediency rather than ideological conviction.

From the Sheikh to the Present

The sole spokesperson of Kashmiri Muslims and preeminent leader of the NC, Sheikh Abdullah, facilitated J&K's accession to the Union of India in 1947. He tirelessly championed India's cause in Kashmir as well as at the United Nations.

At the height of his power, Abdullah brooked no dissent. He even went to the extent of exiling the dissidents who expressed misgivings about Kashmir's accession to India.

After he was unceremoniously sacked by Jawaharlal Nehru in 1953, Abdullah did a volte-face. Out of power, Abdullah endorsed his longtime lieutenant, Afzal Beg's Plebiscite Front, and advocated for Kashmir's right to self-determination. Abdullah's confrontational attitude towards New Delhi ended when he engaged in negotiations with Indira Gandhi, paving the way for the Indira-Sheikh Accord.

After multiple detention spells, Abdullah returned as the Chief Minister of J&K in 1975. The accord was a downgrade for J&K in its constitutional relationship with the Union of India. According to A.G. Noorani, the accord was a "fig-leaf to cover abject surrender as the price for return to power".

Accommodating the union government while in power and defying it when out of power has been the leitmotif of mainstream parties in Kashmir. This conduct that oscillates between contestation and capitulation has worked to the detriment of the people of Kashmir.

Many Kashmiris saw the 1975 Accord as a betrayal, signalling an acceptance of a much-diminished constitutional relationship with India in exchange for marginal concessions of personal power and capitulation to the terms set by the Union government.

NC’s backpedalling and complicit attitude towards New Delhi after assuming office in October of last year is another chapter in the long and sordid story of mainstream politics in Kashmir.

(Raheel Bashir is a PhD candidate at the Centre for Political Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.)

(Aurif Muzafar is a lawyer and a PhD candidate at the National Academy of Legal Studies and Research, Hyderabad.)