(Author’s Note: This article was inspired by "Kashmir Beyond Slogans: Seven Point Formula to Realism and Reconciliation," by retired Justice Syed Manzoor Hussain Gillani. In that article, Justice Gillani alludes to his Urdu book, Aaina-e-Kashmir. I had the privilege of reading and extensively commenting on that book while it was still in draft form. Aaina-e-Kashmir is a valuable document, one capable of provoking debate and the much-needed action it calls for.)
It was not uncanny, but predictable. On the anniversary of ‘Operation Sindoor’ and ‘Operation Bunyan-un-Marsoos’, military representatives from both sides traded barbs while celebrating their "victories" against each other. The rhetoric was theatrical, the claims inflated, and the truth buried beneath an overcharged nationalist pride fueled by social media-esque commentary disguised as analysis.
Here is the truth that neither New Delhi’s strategic community nor Rawalpindi’s GHQ wants to admit: India and Pakistan have fought several wars, but aside from 1971—which led to the creation of Bangladesh as a new nation—almost every other conflict has been strategically indecisive. This is not to diminish India’s early victories in Jammu and Kashmir, and later Siachen, which remain massive and permanent, nor to ignore Pakistan having lost small patches of territory to India in every war. Yet the comparison between India and Pakistan hides more than it reveals.
Consider the scale. India is roughly 3.7 times larger than Pakistan in total land area and 5.7 times larger in population. But India, a nation seven times larger by any rational metric of power, remains psychologically locked into a competition with a smaller neighbour to the point of obsession. This obsession locks India into a strategic stalemate that prevents it from unleashing its true potential and global ambitions.
Pakistan's story is equally grim, if not more. A medieval mindset. A shrinking state. A sagging economy. Decaying institutions - the judiciary, parliament, civil administration, local government – that could have held the society together.
Therefore, the soap opera spectacle that everyone was subjected to on the ‘war’ anniversary is utterly unsustainable. While Pakistan falters internally and regionally, India—even seen in the regional context and compared to China—has diminished over the years. Under these circumstances, the rhetoric of ‘Operation Sindoor’ and the Indian claims of its continuity mean nothing except empty slogans for home audiences who feed on nationalism from their phone screens.
Pakistan matches this word for word, ditto for ditto.
The War That Proved Nothing
The brief conventional conflict in May 2025 proved the point perfectly. India launched cross-border strikes under ‘Operation Sindoor’ on May 7, 2025, targeting alleged militant infrastructure. Pakistan responded with ‘Operation Bunyan-un-Marsoos’. Despite the kinetic exchange—reportedly involving the downing of advanced aircraft and missile duels—nothing was decided. A US-brokered ceasefire on May 10 did not resolve Kashmir, did not dismantle the alleged terror infrastructure, and did not alter territorial control.
The only thing that changed was the legal landscape: India’s halting of Indus Waters Treaty was matched by Pakistan’s suspension of the Simla Accord in April 2025, thus removing the legal brakes that once constrained military adventurism. While Pakistani talk of suspension meant nothing on the ground, India’s moratorium of the water treaty poses a serious threat to Pakistan’s agriculture, since 70 per cent of its water needs come from Indus Basin. In the future, this could become the main cause of conflict – and an existential one – replacing the slogan-filled jugular vein rhetoric on Kashmir.
But here is the dirty open secret of South Asian warfare: India and Pakistan simply cannot fight beyond a few days. Even if external mediation never arrived and the war somehow dragged on, it would still collapse within a couple of weeks—and once again, it would decide nothing.
Military analysts estimate India maintains war stockpiles sufficient for roughly 10 to 40 days of intense combat, while Pakistan’s ammunition reserves might last barely four days. Neither nation has the logistical depth to win a decisive victory. As in the past, any future war would be inconclusive, leading to the same US-brokered ceasefire and the same frozen stalemate.
The Proxy Trap: Cheaper, But Deadlier
Since conventional war is unsustainable, both nations have fallen back on proxy wars—in Punjab, Kashmir, Balochistan, and the former tribal areas. These proxy wars are cheaper to sustain, but they delay peacebuilding, squander chances for resolution, and freeze resources away from economic and social development, further delaying any reproachment.
For Pakistan: The architecture of terror is no longer a cheap lever of influence; it is a parasite consuming the host. In late 2025, reports emerged that the ISI is now uniting ideological rivals—Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP)—to fight a proxy war in Balochistan. If that is true, it is a chilling development: the goal is to crush the Baloch insurgency and refocus on India. But relying on the ISIS brand of retrograde jihadis to enforce order is the mark of a state that has run out of options.
For India: The Balochistan card is a double-edged sword. While it serves as a retaliatory headache for Islamabad, it does not bring India closer to resolving Kashmir, nor does it create a conducive atmosphere in its backyard that would support commerce and enterprise, and vital linkages to the outside world – all necessary tools to sustain India’s growth and global ambition.
The material facts on the ground – on both sides – cannot be changed through militancy. Pakistan has already surrendered its claims on Kashmir after the Simla Accord of 1972, only to renew them through an insurgency that has caused massive damage to Kashmir and its people. Such adventures must stop, for they carry nothing good in their wake. Similarly, India must stop fuelling insurgencies in Balochistan and other regions of Pakistan.
What Must Change: Six Suggestions
1. The Pakistani Army must take a back seat. Both countries must formalise a "Civilian Oversight Charter" for all diplomacy. Pakistan must ensure its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, not the ISI or GHQ, leads engagement with India. Until the Army takes a back seat, no peace deal will ever survive.
2. Dismantle the architecture of militancy. Pakistan must shut down all militant camps without exception. India must reciprocate by ceasing all non-state actions against Pakistan. Verification by a neutral third party—perhaps the UN or a US technical team—would provide diplomatic cover for both sides to claim victory.
3. Restore the spirit of Simla with updated realities. Both the countries should sign a "New Compact" reaffirming the Line of Control (LoC) as a permanent International Border, perhaps with some minor adjustments. Both India and Pakistan must formally surrender revanchist claims on the territories under each other’s de facto control and must accept that the territorial status quo is the new reality.
4. Decouple water from blood. India must immediately reinstate the Indus Waters Treaty under World Bank arbitration. A new initiative, Water for Peace, could be launched, where both nations cooperate on hydroelectric projects rather than hoarding water to hurt the other side.
5. Restore human dignity and autonomy: India must restore statehood to Jammu and Kashmir and protect the region's distinct identity through democratic processes. Pakistan must grant full democratic rights to the people of Gilgit-Baltistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir, officially named Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) in Pakistan, integrating them as full provinces rather than holding them as territorial trophies to be ruled and abused under the guise of ‘masala-e-Kashmir’.
6. Start small with trade. Begin with a "Peace Corridor" for specific non-strategic goods like pharmaceuticals and textiles via the Attari-Wagah border. If goods can cross the border, eventually people will too.
Conclusion
The theatre of war offers no intermission—only escalating costs. The celebrations of ‘Operation Sindoor’ and ‘Bunyan-un-Marsoos’ are not victories; they are pyres of failure. India cannot rise as a great power while it remains psychologically wedded to a neighbour one-third its size. Pakistan cannot survive as a state while its Army clings to anti-India rage as a substitute for economic strategy.
The Arab world, once a willing patron, now humiliates Pakistan at every turn. The only reliable dividends left lie in trade—with India, and through India to Afghanistan and beyond. But those doors only open with peace.
It is time to retire the rhetoric. Peace is not a concession to the other side. It is the bare minimum required for both nations to outlive their own obsessions.
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