SRINAGAR: Is the political future of Jammu and Kashmir tethered to the language of security?
The recent observations of the Supreme Court of India appear to suggest so. In mid-August, while hearing a bunch of petitions seeking restoration of statehood to the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir, the Supreme Court observed: “We cannot ignore what happened in Pahalgam. The ground situation must be considered.” The reference was to the April 2025 Pahalgam terror attack, in which 25 tourists and a local pony operator were killed.
For many Kashmiris, the news came with a sense of déjà vu. Since the revocation of Jammu and Kashmir’s special status and its bifurcation and demotion to two Union Territories, despite several assurances made from time to time, there has been disbelief in the Valley.
On August 5, 2019, the Parliament revoked Jammu & Kashmir’s special status by abrogating Article 370 and bifurcated and downgraded the state into two Union Territories. The move was billed as historic integration. But in the Valley, the mood was sombre as many equated it to a collapse of identity and dignity.
The union government promised statehood would return “at an appropriate time” on the same day and several times thereafter. The Supreme Court’s December 2023 judgment, which upheld the abrogation, recorded this assurance and directed that elections be held, and statehood restored.
The elections were finally held in October 2024. But two years after Supreme Court verdict, Jammu & Kashmir continues to function as a Union Territory.
In its December 2023 judgement, the Supreme Court recorded that Centre has assured restoration of statehood ‘soon’.
But ‘soon’, as many Kashmiris opine, is nowhere in sight. As one observer said sardonically, “it is stretched like elastic.”
The Supreme Court’s recent observation has dampened the hopes for restoration of Jammu and Kashmir’s statehood.
By bringing in the Pahalgam attack, in the Supreme Court effectively gave judicial voice to the Centre’s stance: democracy cannot precede stability. The Leaflet reported that the Bench insisted “ground realities” must weigh on any decision about restoring statehood.
The April 2025 attack in Pahalgam that killed 26 people triggered severe diplomatic retaliation between India and Pakistan, including border closures, diplomat expulsions, and suspension of key treaties. This escalated into a four-day military conflict from May 7-10, highlighting the vulnerability of the region.
Reframing the Statehood Debate
For legal scholars, the court kowtowing statehood demand to security represents a reframing.
“The tragic Pahalgam incident of April 22, 2025, should not impede the restoration of statehood to Jammu and Kashmir. Law enforcement must remain vigilant regardless of whether it is a State or a Union Territory,” says lawyer Asif Ali Rather, and adds that and there's no evidence of a connection between the incident and statehood restoration.
“The people of Jammu and Kashmir have consistently voiced their desire for statehood, aligning with the constitutional principle of federalism and the Court’s directive for prompt restoration. Delaying this process risks undermining the region’s democratic aspirations and the 2023 judgment’s intent,” the lawyer says.
For both legal experts and political analysts, the SC’s Pahalgam remark has turned the statehood debate from a constitutional right into a security issue, giving Delhi room to delay.
Instead of treating statehood as a constitutional guarantee awaiting revival, it is now treated as a concession contingent on counter-insurgency progress, many of them say.
Some, however, opine that New Delhi’s delay and such observations of the court are also fostered by local politics.
Advocate Mir Imran, General Secretary Bar Association Handwara, says, “Omar Abdullah’s response shows the retreat of mainstream politics. Once promising to fight for Article 370, he now limits the struggle to a signature campaign for statehood. By shrinking the demand, he risks legitimising the loss of Article 370 and statehood, thus reducing the political question to mere administrative crumbs.”
Delhi’s Narrative: Development First
The delay in statehood is at odds with the ‘positive’ claims made by the Centre since 2019.
The Union government maintains that since 2019, Kashmir has witnessed “a new dawn”. The Jammu & Kashmir Department of Information & Public Relations (DIPR) lists milestones: record-breaking tourism, unprecedented Amarnath Yatra numbers, foreign investment pledges, and an influx of infrastructure projects.
A Times of India report echoed this line, describing Kashmir “six years after Article 370” as witnessing economic revival, better connectivity, and an aspirational youth demographic.
The Modi government maintains that for decades, the special status granted to Jammu and Kashmir kept it isolated from several national reforms, limiting private investment and economic growth. Today, investors are looking at Kashmir with renewed interest, leading to developments in tourism sector, real estate, and industrial projects, his party functionaries say.
After the reading down of Article 370, the BJP government at the Centre announced several ambitious policies to boost development in Jammu and Kashmir. Among them was a 6,000-acre land bank for setting up industries and increasing manufacturing. More than half has been transferred to the Department of Industries and Commerce—2,125 acres in Jammu and 1,000 acres in Kashmir. It is, however, unclear who the beneficiaries of the industrial policy are and at what stages of the set-up these new industries are.
The counter to Delhi narrative
Several experts, however, have dug holes in the government’s development narrative.
Bhanwar Meghwanshi, in his special report on Kashmir, “What Are The People of Jammu & Kashmir Thinking After The Abrogation of Article 370?” quotes politicians – from Waheed Para of the Peoples’ Democratic Party to CPI (M)’s Mohammad Yousuf Tarigami – to point out that special status to Jammu and Kashmir was constitutionally granted through Article 370, and that it was a bridge between India and Kashmir.
“Now the LG rules; the assembly or elected government has no power,” the report quotes Tarigami as saying.
Journalist Anuradha Bhasin, in her book, ‘A Dismantled State, The Untold Story of Kashmir After Article 370,’ also questions the official narrative, while averring that the ground realities have been invisibilised under severe crackdown on the press and civil society.
“Beneath the official narrative of Kashmir, post abrogation of Article 370 lay buried deafening silence. It was like a cloak that muzzled unheard sounds that were reflective of myriad dimensions of political and social structures. A population with their aspirations remained numbed,” she writes.
Political Voices: A Fractured Consensus
Across Kashmir’s political spectrum, there is consensus on the need for statehood. They question the duplicity of the Centre in bragging about ‘normalcy, peace and development’ in Kashmir, yet selectively invoking terrorism to stonewall demands for statehood.
Political parties, however, are divided over how the statehood can be achieved.
Speaking at the Independence Day event on August 15, Chief Minister Omar Abdullah asked why the actions of terrorists and their supporters across the border should dictate J&K’s status. While emphasizing that it was unfair to punish the people of J&K for a crime they did not commit, he announced a signature campaign for statehood to garner public support, for final submission to the apex court.
Reflecting on J&K’s transition from a state to a Union Territory, the Chief Minister called the current governance structure “designed for failure,” citing stalled Cabinet decisions and lack of bureaucratic accountability. He questioned whether J&K had achieved equality with the rest of India, asserting that the prolonged wait for statehood and unfulfilled promises from Delhi had dimmed hopes, though he remained determined to fight for change.
PDP leader Mehbooba Mufti, who accuses the Centre of weaponising militancy to deny statehood, maintains that the Jammu and Kashmir issue goes far beyond questions of statehood or constitutional status. “Unless New Delhi engages with the political aspirations of the people and addresses the core issue head-on it will remain on uncertain footing regardless of the force it deploys,” she said while batting for a sincere process of dialogue and reconciliation to bring lasting peace and dignity to the region.
Sajad Lone of People’s Conference was extremely critical of Abdullah’s signature drive. He wrote on X (Formerly Twitter), “We will support any movement towards statehood. But please don’t make a mockery of statehood. ….. Let us approach the Supreme Court as a constitutional entity….”
“We are facing a constitutional battle, not a popularity contest,” he added.
Altaf Bukhari of the Apni Party opined that Delhi must decide politically on statehood and not leave it to the courts.
While there is an overall political agreement on the goal, there is divergence on the path to be adopted, reflecting Kashmir’s uneasy political landscape as it operates within the confines of Delhi’s power.
On the Ground: Between Hope and Distrust
Among ordinary Kashmiris, the issue resonates less in legalistic terms and more in lived experience.
A teacher from Srinagar said, “It is not about power alone. It is about respect. Union Territory status feels like we have been reduced.”
On Reddit forums, young Kashmiris debate whether the abrogation has brought meaningful progress or simply entrenched control. Some cite improved infrastructure; others argue jobs and land rights remain elusive.
An essay in The Conversation summarised this duality, concluding that while recent elections “brought hope back to politics,” ultimate authority still belongs to the Modi government.
For many in the Valley, that gap between representation and sovereignty is at the heart of the statehood debate.
Conditional Statehood
What is increasingly clear is that statehood, when restored, will not look like the pre-2019 version. Reports suggest it could come with “terms and conditions”—Delhi may retain control over police, land, and investment policy.
That would create a new model of constrained statehood, unique in India’s federal landscape. For some, partial restoration may be better than none. For others, it risks deepening the sense of dispossession.
Several political leaders were contacted for their views on what a future statehood status, if restored in Jammu and Kashmir, would look like. But despite several phone calls, text messages and WhatsApp messages, there was no response. National Conference legislator Ahsan Pardesi told the Kashmir Times that “our party has restrained us from speaking to the press about the statehood issue.”
NC spokesperson, Tanvir Sadiq, kept postponing an interview and, after repeated reminders, blocked the phone number. Similarly, there was no response from Member Parliament Aga Ruhullah Mehdi or opposition legislator, Waheed Para.
Adv Mir Imran, Gen Secretary Bar Association Handwara, told the Kashmir Times,
"Statehood for J&K will almost certainly not be restored in its original form.” What was taken away in August 2019 was not only statehood but also special status under Article 370 and 35A, he reminded.
“Delhi has shown no intent of rolling that back. At best, statehood will return as a controlled and conditional version without fiscal autonomy, without constitutional safeguards, and with more central oversight than before,” he predicted.
He elaborated, “In other words, the restoration may look like a concession, but it will be carefully calibrated to keep New Delhi firmly in charge. The question is whether Kashmiri parties will accept this diluted statehood or insist on a fuller political bargain."
If there is some thinking within the political circles about this, it appears that there is still some unwillingness to talk about it publicly or to the media.
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