JAMMU, Oct 28: V.P. Menon who played a major role in bringing together the princely states under the Union of India between 1947 and 1949 as Secretary to the Ministry of States, under the leadership of Sardar Patel, had initially advocated for “Kashmir to remain independent.”
This revelation was made in an article by RTI activist Venkatesh Nayak (TheWire.in). Menon’s personal views about J&K have been documented in the official record of the deliberations of the Defence Committee of the Government of India in 1947. The relevant portion of the document was published with the article.
Menon, who wrote about the events leading to J&K’s accession in his book, ‘The Story of the Integration of Indian States’, however, did not add his personal views, the article states.
Menon flew to Srinagar on October 25, 1947 on the instructions of the Defence Committee.
“Its 8th meeting held earlier that day was chaired by governor general Lord Mountbatten, and attended by prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, deputy prime minister Sardar Patel, defence minister Sardar Baldev Singh, finance minister R.K. Shanmukham Chetty and the minister-without-portfolio N. Gopalaswamy Ayyangar. The heads of the three defence forces, and a host of secretaries and advisors representing key ministries were also present."
"The previous day, the deputy prime minister of the princely state of J&K, R.L. Batra, had arrived in Delhi with an SOS message from Maharaja Hari Singh as hordes of tribes were pouring in from across the northwestern border, committing murder, rape, arson and looting in village after village and town after town. They were less than 50 miles away from Srinagar,” the article states.
Menon’s mandate was to discuss with Maharaja Hari Singh, among other things the possibilities of J&K requesting armed assistance from India to defend the territory from the marauding infiltrators; cooperation between the government of J&K and the National Conference led by Shaikh Mohammed Abdullah; and J&K’s willingness to accede to the Dominion of India.
“Menon flew back to Delhi on October 26 after meeting the maharaja in Srinagar and advising him to move to Jammu with his family for the sake of their safety. He reported his observations to the Defence Committee at its 9th meeting held the same day. The Committee advised him to fly back to Kashmir to secure J&K’s accession to India. The exact date and time of his next round of travel to J&K have become a matter of controversy thanks to the varying narratives published by Indian and foreign historians and authors. I hope to comment on this issue later this year, based on archival research,” the article states.
It further adds, “Lord Mountbatten accepted J&K’s Instrument of Accession on October 27, 1947 when it was presented to him with the signature of Maharaja Hari Singh. Its text and the maharaja’s letter explaining the dire situation that had arisen in J&K were published in the pages of local and foreign media on October 28. It is in the record of the Defence Committee’s 10th meeting held on that day that Menon’s personal and unequivocal opinion about J&K’s future can be found. The chain of the conversation is summarised briefly below:”
“The Defence Committee discussed at length the progress made by the Indian defence forces which had landed in Srinagar the previous morning. Then the deliberations moved on to comparing the situation in Junagadh, Gujarat whose ruler professing the Islamic faith was inclined to accede to the Dominion of Pakistan whereas the majority of the population were Hindus."
"In contrast, J&K had a very large population of Muslims but was ruled by a Hindu Maharaja. Lord Mountbatten was of the view that India was in a strong position because it had declared its intention of ascertaining the will of the people in Kashmir on final accession as soon as the law and order situation there allowed it. So, it would automatically follow that Pakistan would accept a similar procedure for Junagadh."
“Prime Minister Nehru opined that India’s position vis-à-vis the states as a whole would improve enormously if things went well in Kashmir and would be correspondingly weakened if there was excessive delay in clearing up Kashmir and if India became entangled there for a long period."
Sardar Patel said that as far as world opinion was concerned, the longer the Junagadh situation was prolonged, the bigger an issue and more insoluble it would become. Shanmugam Chetty pointed out that world opinion usually ends up on the side of the victorious party in any clash. He said that military preparations should be made in Kashmir for any hostile action on the part of Pakistan."
“Gopalaswami Ayyangar remarked that India’s case in both Kashmir and Junagadh was very strong from a political point of view. General William Lockhart, the then commander-in-chief of the Indian Army, said he saw Kashmir developing into a very big commitment indeed. He also said it was doubtful whether it would be in the power of the Indian Army to restore law and order in the whole of Kashmir if it became a question of that."
“Prime Minister Nehru added that the task of eventually clearing Poonch was likely to be a terrific job [sic] and that it could probably not be taken up at all until the winter was over. Lord Mountbatten pointed out that British officers would not be available to help in a plebiscite in Kashmir, the following spring. He advised that the UN or the UK government be asked to send out officials to help with the plebiscite in Kashmir and Junagadh.”
At this point, the minutes of the Defence Committee meeting record V.P. Menon’s views:
“Mr. Menon pointed out that the two were not identical problems. Junagadh was a comparatively straight issue whereas Kashmir had relations with both Dominions and frontiers with other countries. The best solution in the end might be for Kashmir to remain independent.”
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