The recent Israel-Iran war—and the subsequent US involvement—has set off alarm bells across the West Asia, even among America’s allies. Behind closed doors, leaders are asking: When will it be our turn? And what excuse will be used?
In the narrow lanes of Istanbul’s Alibeyköy district, 78-year-old Iranian exile Hassan Moradi told me that after surviving the Israeli and US strikes, Iran now has a rare and historic opportunity—not just to reclaim leadership in the Muslim world, but to position itself as the standard-bearer for the Third World’s fight against colonialism.
Iran had a similar chance after its 1979 revolution.
But various factors squandered that promise: Iraq’s imposed war, the myopic vision of Iran’s leadership, its insistence on leading only the Shia sect rather than the wider Muslim or Third World, meddling in other nations’ affairs rather than building alliances, and its backing of Shia militias—all these moves turned Iran’s influence into a liability.
On the domestic front, also Iranian government had little to boast of. The brutal crackdown on protests following the 2022 death of 22-year-old Kurdish woman Mahsa Amini in custody, and the shocking negligence in internal security that allowed Israel’s Mossad to build a highly effective network under the government’s nose, have severely tarnished Iran’s image.
Iran’s stature in the region today can be measured by the fact that, during the recent war, when the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) foreign ministers met in Istanbul, all eyes were on Iran.
The foreign ministers and delegations of Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and others were seen clustering around the Iranian delegation, seeking consultations. In the past, Iran’s representatives at such gatherings were often sidelined and isolated.
Therefore, it looks high time for Iran to embark on genuine political reforms, so that its people can finally breathe the air of freedom after decades of suffocation and also focus its security apparatus from repressing its own population and neighbouring states to dismantling Israeli spy networks.
Externally, Iran needs to invest its energies in building a united front against imperialism and abandon the policy of Shia proxy militias that have devastated Syria, Lebanon, and beyond.
While Iran’s ties with Gulf nations have long been fraught, another regional heavyweight, Türkiye, for decades viewed Iran as a source of instability and opposed its nuclear ambitions.
But Israel’s unilateral strikes on Iran have now rattled Ankara too. There are growing fears that one day Israel might target Türkiye itself, even though Türkiye is a NATO member. This concern was echoed by Devlet Bahçeli, head of Türkiye’s Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and a key ally of President Erdoğan. He warned that Israel’s campaign against Iran was part of a grander plot to encircle Türkiye and sabotage its regional aspirations. As he put it:
“Israel’s political and strategic goal is to encircle Anatolia, support terrorism in Türkiye at the behest of its masters, and derail Türkiye’s rise as a power.”
Israel Tested Turkish Air Defences
According to one Turkish columnist, Israeli F-35 jets tried to overfly Turkish airspace during the strikes on Iran. They were chased off by Turkish F-16s and AWACS aircraft. It looks they were possibly testing Türkiye’s air defences.
During the war, Türkiye’s top brass convened security meetings twice, closely studying Israeli military tactics. Erdoğan personally reached out to regional leaders, US President Donald Trump, and Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian. He also spoke with Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa and Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani.
Soon after the war, Erdoğan announced plans to accelerate Türkiye’s medium and long-range ballistic missile program and make its defence system fully self-reliant. He shared his speech on social media alongside the Ottoman imperial seal, declaring:
“The principle of the victorious Ottoman army was: If you want freedom, if you want to live on this soil with dignity and integrity, if you want prosperity and harmony, if you want peace, you must always be prepared for war.”
What enraged Erdoğan most was Europe’s support for the strikes on Iran, even as US-Iran nuclear talks were underway at the highest level.
Sources say that as early as September last year, after Israel assassinated Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, Turkish officials began mapping out scenarios for possible Israeli attacks and a broader regional war.
They drew up emergency plans, including preparations for a potential refugee influx. In October, Ankara even reopened dialogue with jailed Kurdish rebel group PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan to prevent his group from becoming a proxy for Iran or Israel.
Türkiye was the first Muslim nation to recognise Israel in 1949, and in the 1990s, they were allies—when Ankara’s security forces sought help during internal unrest against Kurdish rebels and against the Caucasian neighbour, Armenia.
But after Erdoğan came to power in 2003, Türkiye and Israel increasingly clashed over Palestine. Relations soured dramatically in 2010 after Israeli forces stormed the Mavi Marmara, killing 10 Turkish activists in international waters.
Though ties later improved, the 2023 Gaza war ended Ankara’s efforts at reconciliation. But it is also true that Israel’s campaigns to weaken Hezbollah, which led to the toppling of Syria’s Assad regime, helped Turkiye to become a dominant regional power, where once Iran held sway. But Israeli officials now openly declare that their greatest regional challenge is Türkiye, with its resources and influence.
In the eastern Mediterranean, Israel’s military might dominates one end; Türkiye’s the other.
One of the first flashpoints was over Syria, where Netanyahu’s government opposed Turkish radar and air-defence bases in the south. US mediation led to a hotline between Türkiye and Israel in April.
Talks advanced enough that Türkiye even involved Syrian representatives to try and stop Israeli strikes on Syria. The core issue was control over Syrian airspace. Türkiye urged Israel to address its concerns directly with Damascus rather than drag Ankara into the fray.
When Erdoğan visited Iran in 2014, the two signed trade and energy deals. But 11 years later, Türkiye no longer feels the same warmth. Some trace this tension to old Ottoman-Persian rivalries.
But in modern times, it was Iran’s roles in Syria and Lebanon that have driven the wedge. When Iran’s 1979 revolution unfolded, Turkish Islamists had been jubilant. Erdoğan’s mentor, former Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, admired Iranian Islamist ideologue Ali Shariati and long viewed Iran as a model. In 1997, Erbakan tried to unite Muslim-majority states under the D-8 grouping.
Few remember that the downfall of Erbakan’s government began with a Quds Night event in 1997, attended by the Iranian ambassador, where Hezbollah and Hamas flags were waved and critical speeches were made against Türkiye’s secular government. The military used this as a pretext to oust him. Even after forming the AKP in 2002, Erdoğan maintained close ties with Iran, including co-brokering a deal with Brazil over Iran’s nuclear program.
In 2011, Erdoğan became the first Sunni leader to visit Najaf’s Imam Ali shrine and meet Grand Ayatollah Sistani. At one time, relations were so close that US reports accused Erdoğan of betraying Israeli spies’ identities to Tehran.
But Iran’s support for Assad’s brutality in Syria, especially the chemical attacks and sieges of 2013-14, poisoned the relationship. Thereafter, Türkiye accused Iran of undermining its peace process with the PKK, ending the spirit of goodwill.
Ankara quietly served as a diplomatic bridge between Washington and Tehran in the war’s early days. Erdoğan spoke with Trump twice on June 14-15, and with Pezeshkian on June 16. Ankara also reached out to other regional leaders to ease tensions.
Analyst Soner Cagaptay notes that Erdoğan tried to use his rapport with Trump to mediate between Washington and Tehran. This is why the OIC ministers’ declaration condemned Israel, but left America unnamed.
According to Cagaptay, Türkiye hasn’t spoken so gently about US policy in West Asia in a decade, thanks to the personal chemistry between Erdoğan and Trump. Ankara’s real fear is further instability in its neighbourhood that could invite attacks by jihadists or the PKK.
The Israel-Iran clash has already raised urgent questions in Türkiye about its air defence readiness. After seeing Israel’s speed and sophistication, Turkish experts agree that investment is needed in the stealth fighter MMU, KAAN, the Steel Dome, air and missile defence system, and missile stockpiles.
Türkiye’s Steel Dome is designed to counter missiles, drones, and aircraft at various ranges and altitudes. Erdoğan announced it in August 2024, and by October, its core Siper Block-1 component was operational, though experts warn the system isn’t fully ready yet.
Defence analyst Kozan Selçuk Erkan says Türkiye must complete this system swiftly, acquire more AWACS aircraft, and build at least eight Siper units. Erdoğan, too, has vowed to expand missile stockpiles to deter any aggression.
Weekening Iran Affects the Caucasus Region
Iran’s troubles are also opening opportunities for Türkiye, especially in the South Caucasus, where Iran’s ally Armenia is moving towards peace with Azerbaijan. In 2023, Azerbaijan, with the help of Turkiye, retook control of Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenian-majority region.
In March, both sides agreed in principle to end their long-standing conflict.
According to Arif Keskin, a scholar, Iran’s weakness could help Türkiye and Azerbaijan improve ties with Armenia, potentially realising the dream of a Zangezur Corridor linking Türkiye with the wider Turkic world.
Erdoğan sees this corridor as a deeply personal goal—to reconnect Türkiye with Central Asia’s Turkic states and Russian Turkic-dominated provinces before he leaves office.
In this context, Armenia’s premier, Nikol Pashinyan, recently made his first official visit to Türkiye—a breakthrough unlikely before the Israel-Iran war. India, meanwhile, has tried to push Armenia to resist Türkiye’s overtures. Pashinyan’s visit came right after Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s trip to Ankara. Armenia and Türkiye had severed ties in 1993 after Armenia’s seizure of Nagorno-Karabakh.
A senior Armenian diplomat said Erdoğan invited Pashinyan during a phone call for Eid al-Adha, followed by a formal invitation. Calling the visit historic, the diplomat said, it was only through the vision and patience of both leaders that relations could move forward. Pashinyan hopes to end Armenia’s isolation and restore trade and diplomatic links.
In March, Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed to a preliminary peace deal, but Baku keeps pressing demands—including constitutional changes from Armenia to drop its Karabakh claim. Pashinyan has hinted at considering this but faces elections first. He wants to finalise peace by year’s end.
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