Donald Trump and Iran showdown. Getty Images  
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Trump’s America wants to ‘bankrupt’ Iran. Will it Work? 

A report in the ‘Financial Times’ has stated that the US president-elect will opt for ‘maximum pressure’ against Iran the day he assumes office. While the definition of ‘maximum pressure’ is unclear, a reasonable assumption may be another bout of sanctions to ‘bankrupt Iran’. The ultimate end of using these means may be to ‘bring Iran to its knees and do what Uncle Sam wants it to do’.  Will ‘maximum pressure’ work? Will Iran be brought to its knees? 

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“The conditions in the Middle East and broadly the world at large are fluid. World politics and international relations are at an inflection point. This presents an opportunity for Trump 2.0 – to reshape the regional security order.”

Wajahat Qazi*

A report in the ‘Financial Times’ has stated that the US president-elect will opt for ‘maximum pressure’ against Iran the day he assumes office. While the definition of ‘maximum pressure’ is unclear, a reasonable assumption may be another bout of sanctions to ‘bankrupt Iran’. The ultimate end of using these means may be to ‘bring Iran to its knees and do what Uncle Sam wants it to do’.  Will ‘maximum pressure’ work? Will Iran be brought to its knees?

A word on sanctions here will put the argument proffered in this essay into perspective. Sanctions are of two types: primary and secondary. Primary sanctions refer to where a given country, the United States, and its citizens cannot trade or transact with the target country. Secondary sanctions mean a second, or third country cannot also trade, or transact with the target country, say Iran. While sanctions do carry the stamp of the United Nations, more or less their enforcement is contingent on a given hegemonic state’s power but more importantly influence- in broad terms. In practical terms, sanctions are easy to evade- especially secondary ones. The sanctions on Russia are a case in point.

One, besides evading sanctions, the Russian central bank devised ways and means to not only keep the economy merely afloat but also thrive. Two, this is where influence and the respective foreign and defense policies of states are kicked in, states can and do refuse to ‘buy in’ the hegemon’s dictates. India’s example of continuing to buy Russian oil despite US sanctions and pressure illustrates the point. Three, while sanctions can be a tool for ‘regime change’: the US imposes sanctions to create economic pain so that people rise against a given government. But this is largely contingent on subjective perceptions: a given population can turn against the US for the misery and depredations sanctions create. Saddam’s Iraq is a case in point here.

If Trump 2.0 cannot use sanctions – even if their import and tour de force – is stronger than Trump 1.0, to ‘bankrupt Iran’, what other choices does he have?

He can try isolating Iran regionally by pressuring Gulf and Arab states. This approach would work if Iran were a pushover (which it is not). If push comes to shove, and if Iran faces an existential crisis, it can be a ‘spoiler’ in the equations and matrices that define the Persian Gulf and the broader Middle East. By elimination then, this approach too is a nonstarter. These are the practical and tactical impediments to using sanctions to enforce the hegemon’s will.

However, there are strategic and conceptual factors and variables at work as well. The primary one is the diminishing and diminished clout of the United States.  This calls for a fuller explanation: for sanctions to effectively work, a broad-based ‘coalition of the willing’ is necessary. In effect, it means multilateralism even when its ingress is determined by the hegemon of the day. In this sense, some degree of ‘soft power’ informed influence is the necessary starting point. The United States, while by the indices of hard power might still be a superpower, but it cannot gain or elicit the cooperation of other states at gunpoint. It needs influence. But this has waned. The country may not then be able to generate that consensus. Plus, more importantly, the world is no longer unipolar; it is multipolar.

The major axes of this multi-polar world are the United States, China, and Russia. The defining feature of this tripolar contest is Cold War 2.0. In the matrices and interstices, it becomes extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the United States to enforce its will. In economic and financial terms while China has chosen not to be an egregiously and overtly involved player in the Middle East, it keeps on buying Iranian oil. Against the backdrop of a slowing economy, and putative trade conflicts with the United States, Iranian oil becomes all the more important.

In effect then Trump 2.0’s ‘maximum pressure’ on Iran to ‘bankrupt it’ is a non-starter even when it is conceptualized. Does Trump 2.0 have better options?

Yes. Indeed.

First, in a wee digression, what must be asserted here with vigour is the quality of American democracy by the yardstick of its legislators: almost all that I have heard speak – on any given issue- seem like grey-suited robots. They have standard lines to trot that suggest mindlessness and inability to apply minds and intellect to one, analyze and two resolve a given issue. Given this abysmal quality of legislative talent, the onus falls on Trump 2.0. So, what can and must he do?

The conditions in the Middle East and broadly the world at large are fluid. World politics and international relations are at an inflection point. This presents an opportunity for Trump 2.0 – to reshape the regional security order. The starting point for this must be a cease-fire in Gaza, followed by the crafting of a durable ‘settlement’ like a regional security architecture that redounds to peace and security for all states that constitute the Middle Eastern firmament.

This must include Iran whose legitimate quest for survival and security must be sated. To be sure, this is a ‘tall order’ that would require diplomatic skill, finesse, and dexterity plus, of course, the capacity to ‘knock heads together’ to make parties sit and talk at the negotiating table.  Bluster, bluff, posturing, sanctions, and muscle flexing, to the contrary, can only bring the Middle East and by extension the world to the brink. The choices are for Trump 2.0 to make: able statesmanship that brings peace and stability or partisan brinkmanship that can only lead to disaster!

*The author is a Kashmir-based columnist.

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