
A new political storm is brewing in Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir (PaJK) over 12 legislative seats reserved for refugees from Jammu and the Kashmir Valley.
The controversy surfaced after the umbrella group of civil society organisations Awami Action Committee recently demanded the abolition of these refugee-designated seats in the region's Legislative Assembly.
While the Assembly is intended to represent residents of PaJK, it also includes 12 reserved seats for refugees who migrated from across the LoC in different periods and are now residing across Pakistan instead of PaJK.
These seats were given constitutional cover under the 13th Amendment (Act 2018) to Act 74, which serves as PaJK’s interim constitution. Before this, the refugee seats were managed through electoral rules, subject to simple majority amendments without the need for Pakistan’s federal approval.
In 2014, a petition was filed in the Muzaffarabad High Court challenging these seats, but before judgment could be passed, 2018 Act granted them constitutional protection, rendering the petition invalid.
Constitutionally, these seats are meant only for refugees who migrated from Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir, yet over the years, they have been politically linked to the wider "Kashmir cause"—a move critics say lacks consistency, especially since regions like Ladakh are excluded from this representational scheme.
PaJK Assembly has a total of 53 assembly seats—45 are directly elected, and 8 are reserved for women, technocrats, and overseas Kashmiris. Of the 45 directly elected seats, 33 fall within PaJK territory, while 12 are designated for refugees from Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir, living across Pakistan's provinces.
Six are allocated to refugees from Jammu and six from the Valley—primarily those who fled during the 1947 and 1965 conflicts.
Besides political representation, these refugees also enjoy a 19% quota in jobs within PaJK, including a later-added 6% for those who migrated post-1990. Elected representatives on these refugee seats receive development funds from the PaJK budget, which they are free to spend within Pakistani territory under the guise of refugee welfare.
These disbursements began during Sardar Attique Ahmed Khan’s tenure as Prime Minister in 2006. The Rehabilitation Department in PaJK also receives a considerable budget for refugee areas—despite the fact that refugee welfare technically falls under Pakistan’s federal responsibilities, as per the Karachi Agreement of 28 April 1949.
Critics argue these seats are used by Islamabad to control Muzaffarabad politically, ensuring favourable regimes. Refugee-seat lawmakers are often accused of political blackmail and triggering no-confidence motions. Despite recurring questions over their legitimacy, the latest demands for abolishment, this time from within PaJK—have unsettled various quarters. Ministers elected on these seats have aggressively opposed the Awami Action Committee’s demands, labelling them an “anti-Kashmir conspiracy.”
Refugee Influence in PaJK Politics
When Jammu and Kashmir was divided in 1947, only one recognisable political figure—Sardar Ibrahim—remained in the PaJK region. Most leadership of the Muslim Conference had relocated to Pakistan, including Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah, Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas, K.H. Khurshid, A.R. Sagar, and Syed Nazir Hussain Shah. Their prominence, coupled with the political vacuum in PaJK, led to their overwhelming influence.
In fact, the first PaJK cabinet included just one local representative—the rest were refugees from across the ceasefire line.
Later, Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas was appointed head of the Kashmir Refugees Central Relief Committee. After Sardar Ibrahim’s ouster, Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah became president of PaJK. Refugee leaders remained key political actors: Khurshid Hassan Khurshid became president with their support, and in 1975, the first PaJK Prime Minister, Abdul Hameed Khan—originally from the Valley and residing in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa—was also a refugee.
Over time, refugee influence in PaJK politics solidified, despite the fact that the State Subject Rule technically limits recognition of non-resident Kashmiris to two generations. Refugees enjoy political power, job quotas, and budget allocations without contributing taxes to the PaJK exchequer.
Many refugees from 1947, especially from Jammu, resettled in Punjab but continue to face settlement issues. Unlike later refugees from 1965 and 1971, who were better integrated, the earliest arrivals received inadequate attention.
While a committee under Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas was formed to address their issues, it focused more on PaJK politics than refugee welfare. The Pakistan government began issuing stipends and food rations to them, which further shifted their focus from rights advocacy to political entanglements.
Despite the Karachi Agreement giving the responsibility of refugee welfare to Pakistan, these groups were integrated into PaJK’s political framework and public sector. Ironically, they were never settled in PaJK itself—Jammu refugees headed straight to Punjab, while Valley refugees passed through PaJK but eventually resettled across Pakistan.
The demographic impact is telling. In the 2021 PaJK election rolls, of 3.22 million registered voters, 2.8 million were residents of PaJK, while only 464,000 were refugee voters. Among them, Valley-origin voters numbered a mere 30,000 compared to over 430,000 from Jammu—highlighting the demographic disparity and the limited claim that these seats represent "Kashmir" as a whole.
Approximately 8,000 families crossed the ceasefire line post-1990 and settled in refugee camps within PaJK. Despite paying taxes and residing in the region, these families remain without proper housing, property rights, or even domicile certificates.
This exclusion prevents them from fully benefiting from the 6% job quota allocated to them. Legal obstacles continue to block their path to full citizenship rights, making their situation uniquely precarious compared to earlier migrants.
In a recent rally, the Awami Action Committee called for scrapping the refugee seats. In response, ministers and assembly members from those seats condemned the demand, branding it a betrayal of the Kashmir cause. But many analysts argue that it is time to revisit the logic behind these seats—especially when their practical impact contradicts democratic principles.
Several solutions are being discussed:
Vacant Symbolism: Mimic India's approach of leaving seats for Pakistan-administered territories vacant in the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly until a final resolution of the region is reached.
Symbolic Representation Only: Maintain refugee seats, but strip them of legislative power over PaJK’s internal affairs. Political parties may consider proportional representation models.
Resettlement and Taxation: Relocate these refugees to PaJK and include them in its tax net, justifying their political and economic stake.
Revoke Act 74 and Karachi Agreement: Recognise the PaJK government as the representative legislative authority for the whole of Jammu and Kashmir, including Ladakh, per the 24 October 1947 declaration. Assign symbolic seats to refugees without giving them control over PaJK's governance or employment quotas unless they reside within and contribute to the region.
The time may have come to separate symbolism from substance. Political representation, especially in conflict regions, must reflect both geographic legitimacy and democratic accountability. The refugee seats in PaJK are no longer just a legal artefact—they are a political question with far-reaching implications.
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