Recently, India once again distanced itself from Iran — this time by refusing to endorse a Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) statement that criticised an unprovoked Israeli attack on Tehran.
Earlier, India had voted against Iran at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), aligning itself with Western powers. These moves are consistent with New Delhi’s growing strategic embrace of Washington and Tel Aviv — but they also mark a stark contrast to a forgotten chapter in Indian diplomacy.
Here is the story of how Iran, in 1994, quietly saved India from international sanctions and diplomatic humiliation at the United Nations — and how, in the years that followed, India failed to return the favour.
When Iran later faced global pressure, isolation, and conflict, New Delhi often aligned with Western interests or remained silent, offering no gesture of gratitude for the favour that once protected its national dignity.
It was a chilly March morning in 1994. Snow blanketed the Elbruz Mountains overlooking Tehran Airport as a special Indian military aircraft touched down. Braving the cold, the plane carried India’s ailing and bedridden External Affairs Minister Dinesh Singh, accompanied by three aides and a doctor.
Singh was admitted to the AIIMS for a long time. He had left his hospital bed at the instructions of Prime Minister P V Narasimha Rao to carry a special and personal message to Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. Some other person took his bed to avoid any spooky person noticing the absence of the minister from the hospital.
It would turn out to be Singh’s final diplomatic assignment in a five-decade career — and perhaps his most consequential.
Just two years earlier, India had narrowly avoided economic collapse, going so far as to mortgage its gold reserves. With the Soviet Union dissolved, Russia was too fragile to offer diplomatic backing.
Meanwhile, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), supported by powerful Western nations, was preparing to sponsor a resolution at the United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) condemning India for alleged human rights violations in Kashmir and seeking sanctions. If passed, the resolution was expected to go to the UN Security Council, where Western nations were awaiting to gang up and impose economic sanctions.
The OIC, like the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), operates on the principle of consensus. Recognising this procedural lever, former diplomat and Iran expert M K Bhadrakumar later observed that Rao had wisely identified Tehran as the key to blocking the resolution. By persuading Iran to abstain or oppose, India could prevent a consensus — and thus kill the move at its source.
Iranian officials, however, were initially baffled. In New Delhi, the Iranian ambasador had assured the visiting Hurriyat delegation that Tehran will ensure the resolution is passed and India is punished.
The urgency of Singh’s visit, given his fragile health, raised eyebrows. Breaking protocol, Iranian Foreign Minister Dr Ali Akbar Velayati personally received him on the tarmac. Holding Singh’s hand, who was in a wheelchair, he anxiously asked what could be so urgent to warrant such a risky journey. Singh responded only with a smile and handed over a formal demarche — India’s diplomatic plea.
Over the next several hours, Singh tirelessly briefed top Iranian officials on the Kashmir situation, meeting with President Rafsanjani, Foreign Minister Velayati, and Majlis Speaker Nateq-Nouri.
By evening, Singh was on a return flight to Delhi — directly to the hospital — but not before securing a message from Rafsanjani assuring Prime Minister Rao that Iran would do all it could to shield India from harm.
Back in New Delhi, a tense 72 hours passed before confirmation came: Iran had quietly blocked the OIC move.
In Geneva, when the Pakistani envoy attempted to push the resolution forward, Iran’s representative — acting on direct instructions from Tehran — refused to support it. He reportedly argued that, as a close friend of both India and Pakistan, Iran believed the matter should be resolved without allowing colonial powers to intervene.
The resolution collapsed. With it, Pakistan’s last serious attempt to bring the Kashmir issue before a UN forum also faded.
The diplomatic consequences were far-reaching. Iran and Pakistan began drifting apart, particularly over Afghanistan. India and Iran, in contrast, found common ground in supporting the Northern Alliance — a coalition deeply opposed to Pakistan’s Taliban allies. The geopolitical realignment stunned Islamabad, where Tehran’s move was denounced as a betrayal.
Notably, India’s delegation at the UNHRC was led not by a government minister but by the Leader of the Opposition, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, accompanied by Minister of State for External Affairs Salman Khurshid and former Chief Minister of Jammu & Kashmir Dr Farooq Abdullah.
In later years, Vajpayee and Abdullah would highlight their roles in India’s diplomatic success — perhaps unaware that Dinesh Singh’s secret mission to Tehran had already laid the foundation days earlier.
True to form, Prime Minister Rao never sought to correct the record or claim credit. He allowed his political rivals a share in the success, never revealing the decisive role of Singh’s back channel diplomacy.
And yet, despite this generous act by Tehran, India never returned the favour. When Iran faced sanctions over its nuclear programme, or when its oil exports were throttled under American pressure, New Delhi quietly reduced imports and pivoted closer to Washington and Tel Aviv. Even as Iran reeled under isolation, India avoided any strong public defence, preferring silence over solidarity.
That a snow-covered morning in Tehran once spared India from global humiliation has largely been forgotten in diplomatic circles — but Tehran may still remember. In a region built on memory, gestures, and betrayal, Iran’s forgotten favour remains one of South Asia’s most overlooked moments of quiet diplomacy — and unrequited gratitude.
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