Two key factors (or themes) will determine the shape and form of 21st century Great Power politics. Decision makers who seek to work outside the international system and even structure and capabilities will shape the world. The key decision makers of and in international relations are Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping (with Donald Trump at the apex).
The 47th president of the United States’ ‘insurgent disruption’, moves and countermoves by Putin and Jinping - to eke out space - in the grand chess board of international relations and Great power competition will determine how world politics will look like. Others will merely play catch up and an adjustment game.
International relations will then correspond to a ‘tri-polar’ world. But hand wringing alarmist commentary and analysis – even by and from sober quarters - suggests that Donald Trump is handing a ‘victory on a platter’ to Putin and Jingping. And that this portends the ‘end of the West’.
Is, the question is, there merit to these alarmist prognostications? Is Donald Trump’s ‘disruptive, insurgent interlude’ the end of the west as we know it?
The answer is a resounding no. But a mere assertion (especially when it is in the negative) does not suffice as an argument. So, what I predicate this answer on?
Can tariff war upset European economy?
A cogent set of explanations warrant developing the argument around Europe, Russia and the United States (under Donald Trump). The 47th president of the United States by ‘weaponizing tariffs’ is throwing the political economy of Europe into a tizzy and tailspin.
While this has some security implications, but in the main, it is Donald Trumps ‘threat’ of withdrawing the security guarantees to Europe that are critical. (NATO and US’ extended deterrence to Europe assumes salience here).
Critics and opponents of Donald Trump assert that by withdrawing the US security guarantee to Europe, Trump is not only making the region vulnerable but also open to a ‘take over’ by Russia’s Vladimir Putin.
Based on a conversation with an analyst of great repute and vigor (who I cannot name because the conversation was private), military takeover of Europe by Putin is a fanciful exaggeration. This is insofar as the gist of the conversation goes. I will now develop my own analysis around this assertion or a quasi-hypothesis.
Security paradigm in Europe
The core elements of my analysis will revolve around ‘the capabilities approach’ in international relations, the possible motivations of decision makers like Donald Trump in ‘disrupting the European security paradigm’ and possible motivations of Vladimir Putin. (There is a decided element of speculation which however is plausible involved in teasing out decision makers’ motivations).
Consider Europe and Trump’s spanner into the works of its security. The region as it is a ‘smug postmodern cocoon’. If Europe remains as it is, the smugness of the region works for Putin (an implication of the conversation I had with the world class analyst). But if Europe develops its own capabilities, then there would be reason for a pause by the Russian president.
In this sense then, Donald Trump is perhaps right in exerting pressure on the Europeans. If, however, things remain as they are, and if there is Great power tension, then why should America get dragged into a conflict for Europe? One answer would be the ‘defense of the West and Western values’.
But this appears to be a churlish and motivated ‘explanation’. Is the ‘West’ (assuming that it is not merely a geographical region, but an extra territorial entity held together and bound by a common set of values) so fragile that it will crumble under a military assault? (This is a real question; not a rhetorical one).
What after ceasefire in Ukraine?
Now let us consider a hypothetical: post a ceasefire in Ukraine and a ‘deal’ between Donald Trump’s America and Russia, will this embolden Putin to invade Europe (say Paris?) as a prelude to a broader takeover of the region?
No. It will not. This is a no brainer which does not require military analysis or acumen. The reason pertains to ‘capabilities’. (I use the term capabilities here in the limited sense of military hardware, hard power and power projection capabilities). Post the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, Russia is a diminished nation that appears to be trying to forge a techno-nationalist identity as a Great power of sorts for itself.
It does not appear to harbour ideological (or post ideological) identity for itself that is expansive in nature. While it is a nuclear state that has a vast arsenal or tactical and strategic nuclear weapons, its military and hard power capability is diminutive (in real and relative terms).
This naturally puts a limit on its power projection capability. The country cannot afford an ‘expansive war’ that not only stretches it militarily, but also economically. Moreover, the extent of its hard power capability is buttressed by a quasi-alliance with China - the actual ‘senior partner’ in the alliance.
How will China look at Europe?
Will China that has a lot at stake encourage or discourage Russia’s ‘multi- front’ war with Europe? (In a lighter vein, against the backdrop of an economic slow- down in the country, China has its electric battery-operated cars to sell in Europe and is in competition with Tesla).
From a military history standpoint, Hitler’s march on Russia- which could be held to be a turning point in Nazi Germany’s miliary ‘fortunes’ and thus a reversal of its expansionism - would still be fresh in the historical and consciousness of Russian strategists.
The main axis of this memory would be that Nazi Germany military’s supply lines and its inability to replenish its losses on the Russian front cost the country the Second World War.
Given all this, and a weak version of the ‘Imperial overstretch’ that a miliary takeover of Europe would entail, Putin would be foolish to do the same. What could then the Russian president ‘settle’ for? While the answer is somewhat speculative, but a ‘cordon sanitaire’ around Ukraine might be what Putin seeks.
If this holds, then Russia under Putin is ‘playing’ the pure interests, or ‘raison d’etat’ game in the sense of protecting his country against real or perceived threats.
Who will play ‘great power politics’?
What can be culled from the delineation of this analysis is, one, the world is on the cusp of Great power politics. Two, the threats that Russia allegedly posed to Europe are more amplified and magnified than real. Three, in the melee of Great power competition, interests and a pecking order of security of states matter.
Four, diplomacy must be conducted in the interstices of these interests and security dynamics. Five, perhaps most salient, world politics appears to be gyrating to motivations, worldviews, perspectives, perceptions and actions of ‘decision makers’ that operate over and beyond conventional ‘systemic constraints’.
And in the interstices of all these, the troika of Donald Trum, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping assume centre stage.
If a geometric analogue is drawn here, and the troika of these world leaders is depicted in the shape of a pyramid, Donald Trump sits at the top.
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