WASHINGTON: An in-depth analysis of declassified documents from the US State Department has uncovered the complex and often contradictory US diplomatic posture towards the Kashmir issue between 1948 and 1957.
These documents, archived by the Office of the Historian, detail a decade where geopolitical strategies shaped by Cold War tensions overrode the principles of self-determination and international law, particularly concerning the fate of Kashmir.
The revelations stem from primary research conducted by the Kashmir, Law and Justice Project, which scrutinized internal US communications during a critical period in South Asian history.
The findings indicate a nuanced yet ultimately compromising US approach to the Kashmir conflict, heavily influenced by the desire to maintain favourable relations with India while managing its strategic interests in Asia.
Initially, the U.S. recognized the Kashmiris' right to self-determination, aligning with the emerging international human rights standards post-World War II.
Documents from January 1948 highlight discussions by Charles W. Lewis, the US chargé in Pakistan, who considered Pakistan’s proposal for a neutral administration in Kashmir followed by a plebiscite as "fair and just."
This was a period marked by a strong US advocacy for a plebiscite to determine Kashmir's future — either as an independent entity or part of India or Pakistan.
In another communication later that year, Lewis mentioned a desire by Sheikh Abdullah for a joint defence of the region by India and Pakistan.
Though Lewis said the idea “sounds attractive,” he believed that the dispute between India and Pakistan was too great for such an idea to work and that proposing it would alienate both governments.
In March 1948, the US proposed an independent Jammu and Kashmir to India.
The US ambassador to India noted that Sir Girija Shankar Bajpai, first Secretary General, Ministry of External Affairs seemed open to a US proposal that the first plebiscite in Kashmir be solely on the issue of independence and then, should the first vote be against independence, a second plebiscite would be on the question of accession to India or Pakistan
As the Cold War intensified, US foreign policy began to prioritize the containment of Soviet influence, which significantly affected its stance on global conflicts, including Kashmir.
The region's strategic location between China, India, and Pakistan added to its geopolitical value, complicating U.S. policies which initially supported self-determination.
By the early 1950s, the US approach had shifted noticeably.
A series of communications between US diplomats and Indian officials reveal a gradual but clear departure from advocating for a plebiscite. This shift was evidenced by the correspondence of Loy Henderson, US Ambassador to India, who in 1951 communicated US frustrations with India's reluctance to hold a plebiscite yet also indicated a more conciliatory approach towards Indian objections.
Opposition to Independent Kashmir
The documents further disclose that economic considerations began to influence US policy.
In discussions about Kashmir’s mineral resources, US diplomats pondered the implications of an independent Kashmir, noting its potential economic non-viability and susceptibility to communist influences.
This culminated in proposals for a multinational development corporation involving the US, the UK, India, and Pakistan to manage Kashmir's resources — a plan that was ultimately deemed unfeasible but indicative of the Cold War-era economic strategies.
In 1950, a memorandum to the Secretary of State explicitly stated that "an independent Kashmir would quite possibly be taken over by the Communists," reflecting the deep-seated anxieties about Soviet expansionism.
Such sentiments led to a reduction in support for an independent Kashmir, with US policy favouring a settlement that would ensure alignment with broader U.S. interests in Asia.
Throughout the 1950s, the US maintained a cautious stance on Kashmir, navigating between Indian and Pakistani sensitivities.
Internal memos reveal a sense of pessimism about resolving the Kashmir issue, with US diplomats often expressing doubt about the feasibility of any agreement.
Ambassador Chester Bowles’ communications with Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in 1952 highlight this, as he lamented the lack of progress on Kashmir and the rigid positions held by both sides.
By the mid-1950s, the US began to disengage from actively pursuing a resolution in Kashmir, as reflected in a 1956 telegram stating that "no pressure short of war will force [the government of India] to relinquish [the] Vale [of Kashmir]."
This marked a resigned acceptance of the status quo, which was maintained to avoid further complications in U.S.-India relations.
The declassified documents end in 1957, leaving a legacy of US diplomatic engagement in Kashmir characterized by initial idealism followed by realpolitik adjustments.
The Cold War not only shaped U.S. foreign policies but also left unresolved conflicts like Kashmir, where strategic interests ultimately overshadowed commitments to self-determination and international norms.
The historical context provided by the US State Department archives offers a deeper understanding of the long-standing international dimensions of the Kashmir dispute and the role played by major powers in its unresolved status.
This report not only sheds light on past US policies but also prompts a reevaluation of current diplomatic approaches to global conflicts where historical grievances continue to influence present-day politics.
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