Recent Indian media reports alleging that Pakistan may be preparing to revive armed militancy in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) have raised concerns about a potential return to instability. Even if partially accurate, such developments would pose severe risks for Kashmiris, whose political agency remains constrained despite reductions in violence and modest economic initiatives.
A renewed insurgency would likely trigger intensified state responses, undermine fragile socio‑economic gains, and reverse the restoration of calm, even though limited and fragile, achieved since 2019. Kashmiris, India, and Pakistan all have incentives to prevent a relapse into conflict. However, there are structural vulnerabilities that external actors could exploit.
What is, therefore, required is a multi‑layered strategy centred on political empowerment, calibrated dialogue, and regional de‑escalation.
A Region in Fragile Equilibrium
Kashmir today occupies a paradoxical space. On one hand, militant incidents have declined significantly, daily life has stabilised, and the government has invested in youth entrepreneurship and infrastructure. On the other hand, political disempowerment remains acute. The downgrading of the former state into a Union Territory, the weakening of elected institutions, and the absence of meaningful political dialogue have produced widespread frustration.
This political vacuum is compounded by broader national trends. Regular episodes of anti‑Muslim violence across India, including the targeting of Kashmiri vendors, have contributed to a pervasive sense of siege among Kashmiri Muslims. While not unique to the region, such developments heighten perceptions of vulnerability and marginalisation. These conditions — alienation, insecurity, and lack of political agency — create openings that external actors could exploit.
Historically, Pakistan has attempted to leverage Kashmiri grievances to advance its own strategic objectives. From ‘Operation Gibraltar’ in 1965 to the proxy conflict of the 1990s, each intervention has produced severe consequences for Kashmiris themselves: militarisation, human rights violations, economic collapse, and inter‑communal ruptures, and further political marginalisation.
The 2025 Pahalgam massacre and subsequent India–Pakistan skirmishes (Operation Sindoor and Operation Bunyan al‑Marsoos) demonstrated how quickly a single violent incident can escalate into a near‑war scenario.
Pakistan’s Strategic Incentives and Constraints
Pakistan’s Kashmir policy has historically been shaped by the institutional imperatives of the military establishment rather than by long‑term political strategy. Initiatives have often been reactive, driven by short‑term calculations or domestic pressures. In the current context, Pakistan’s de facto military regime faces intensifying insurgency in Balochistan, economic fragility, and political volatility. These pressures may incentivise attempts to reassert strategic relevance through renewed activity in Kashmir.
However, Pakistan’s capacity to alter the status quo is almost non-existent. Any tolerance for cross‑border militancy, on part of India or even regionally from Pakistan’s allies, has diminished, and any escalation would likely produce results like quick military escalation from India. Moreover, a new insurgency would not meaningfully advance Kashmiri interests; it would instead expose civilians to heightened risk and further entrench India’s security posture.
India’s Responsibilities as the Larger Power
India’s governance approach in J&K has produced mixed outcomes. While security indicators have improved, the political landscape remains constricted. The absence of an empowered legislature, limited avenues for dissent, and the perception of centralised control have eroded trust. Development initiatives, though important, cannot substitute for political agency.
India’s broader domestic environment also shapes Kashmiri perceptions. The rise of majoritarian rhetoric and episodic communal violence elsewhere in the country reinforces feelings of exclusion. These dynamics weaken claims that integration has produced inclusive citizenship.
As the region’s larger and more institutionally resilient state, India has both the capacity and responsibility to lead de‑escalation efforts. Its ability to stabilise relations with China after the Galwan Valley clashes demonstrates that New Delhi can compartmentalise crises when strategically necessary. A similar approach toward Pakistan — grounded in confidence rather than coercion — is essential for long‑term stability.
Risks of a Renewed Insurgency
A new insurgency would have predictable and devastating consequences:
Escalated state response: Increased militarisation, surveillance, and restrictions on civil liberties.
Economic regression: Collapse of tourism, investment, and youth entrepreneurship.
Social fragmentation: Renewed inter‑communal tensions and erosion of social cohesion.
Diplomatic fallout: Heightened India–Pakistan tensions with potential for miscalculation.
Humanitarian impact: Civilian casualties, displacement, and long‑term trauma.
For Kashmiris, who have endured multiple cycles of conflict, the costs would be disproportionately high. The region cannot afford another externally driven experiment in armed struggle.
Policy Recommendations
A. For India
- Restore Full Statehood and Political Empowerment
Reinstating statehood and enabling credible, empowered local governance is essential for rebuilding trust. Political institutions must have substantive authority, not merely symbolic value.
- Reopen Structured Dialogue with Pakistan
Even limited, issue‑specific engagement (e.g., trade, humanitarian concerns, cross‑LoC travel) can reduce misperceptions and prevent escalation.
- Enhance Transparency and Accountability
Addressing human rights concerns through institutional mechanisms — judicial review, oversight bodies, and transparent investigations — would strengthen India’s credibility.
- Promote Inclusive Development
Economic initiatives must be paired with social inclusion, ensuring that development does not appear as a substitute for political rights.
B. For Pakistan
- Cease Support for Any Non‑State Armed Actors
Pakistan must recognise that militancy has consistently undermined Kashmiri welfare and Pakistan’s own strategic interests.
- Prioritise Diplomatic Engagement Over Coercive Strategies
Constructive dialogue, not proxy conflict, is the only viable path to influencing regional outcomes.
- Address Internal Security Challenges
Stabilising Balochistan and strengthening domestic governance would reduce incentives to externalise crises.
C. For Kashmiri Civil Society
- Reject Armed Mobilisation
Civil society, religious leaders, and youth organisations must articulate a clear stance against any return to violence.
- Strengthen Non‑Violent Political Platforms
Expanding civic engagement, advocacy networks, and community‑based initiatives can create alternative avenues for political expression.
- Promote Inter‑Community Dialogue
Rebuilding trust between communities is essential for long‑term resilience.
Conclusion
Kashmir stands at a critical juncture. The region’s fragile stability could be upended by any attempt to revive militancy, whether externally orchestrated or locally facilitated.
India, Pakistan, and Kashmiris all have strong incentives to prevent such an outcome. Sustainable peace requires political empowerment, calibrated diplomacy, and a collective rejection of violence.
The alternative — another cycle of insurgency and repression — would be catastrophic for all stakeholders, but especially for the people of Kashmir.
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