When Reservation Becomes Regional Exclusion

The controversy over Jammu and Kashmir’s reservation policy is no longer simply about reserved and open-merit seats. It has acquired a much wider social and political dimension.

At the heart of the debate is a disturbing question: Is the present reservation system creating a deep regional imbalance and steadily reducing the representation of Kashmiris in government institutions?

The numbers increasingly being placed in the public domain make that question difficult to ignore.

There is no dispute over the original purpose of reservation to help disadvantaged sections of the population join the mainstream.

The policy was conceived to uplift weaker and historically disadvantaged sections of society. Special quotas were created in government employment and admissions to professional institutions so that communities left behind socially and economically could get greater opportunities. That principle remains important.

But reservation cannot become a system under which one region gains overwhelmingly while another finds its space in public employment steadily shrinking.

Over the years, Jammu and Kashmir’s reservation structure has undergone major changes. The Jammu and Kashmir Reservation Act, 2004, and subsequent rules provided reservations to several categories in government employment and educational institutions.

The framework was expanded further over time. Residents of areas adjoining the International Border were brought within the reservation system alongside those living near the Line of Control.

Another major change came with the introduction of the Economically Weaker Sections, or EWS, quota. The category provides 10 per cent reservation in jobs and education to economically weaker people who do not already benefit from reservations available to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other backward categories.

Post-2019 Phenomenon

After the constitutional changes of August 2019 and subsequent restructuring of laws governing Jammu and Kashmir, the reservation regime underwent further changes.

The cumulative effect has dramatically reduced the share available to open-merit candidates.

But an even more serious concern is emerging over the regional distribution of reservation benefits.

Government figures placed before the Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly provide perhaps the clearest picture yet.

Nearly 11.81 lakh reservation certificates were issued across seven categories in Jammu and Kashmir. Of these, around 86 per cent went to Jammu.

Kashmir received only 14 per cent.

That is not a marginal difference. It is an enormous regional gap.

The category-wise figures make the imbalance even more striking.

Of 7,49,970 Scheduled Tribe certificates, Jammu received 6,93,781, or 92.5 per cent. Kashmir received just 56,189, or around 7.4 per cent.

The Scheduled Caste figures are even more heavily concentrated in Jammu.

Of 1,41,419 SC certificates, Jammu accounted for 1,39,664, or approximately 98.7 per cent. Kashmir received only 1,755, barely 1.24 per cent.

The picture is similar in categories connected with border areas.

Of 7,192 certificates issued to residents of areas adjoining the Line of Control, Jammu accounted for 6,732, or about 93.6 per cent. Kashmir received only 460, around 6.3 per cent.

All 6,732 International Border certificates were issued in the Jammu division.

Under the Other Backward Classes category, 1,30,976 certificates were issued. Jammu received 78,324, or about 59.8 per cent, while Kashmir received 52,652, or around 40.1 per cent.

Only the Reserved Backward Area category showed something approaching regional parity. Of 1,00,848 certificates, Jammu received 50,982, or 50.5 per cent, while Kashmir received 49,866, or about 49.4 per cent.

The EWS figures again show a huge difference.

Of 47,235 EWS certificates issued across Jammu and Kashmir, 43,136, or 91.3 per cent, went to Jammu.

Kashmir received only 4,099, or about 8.6 per cent.

Put together, the overall picture is stark: 86 per cent of nearly 11.81 lakh reservation certificates went to Jammu and only 14 per cent to Kashmir.

These are not estimates produced by an opposition party. They are figures placed before the Legislative Assembly by the government itself.

Reservation certificates, of course, do not automatically translate into government jobs. Different communities and reserved categories are also distributed unevenly between the two regions.

But when such a large share of certificates is concentrated in one region, the consequences for future competition for reserved government jobs cannot simply be dismissed.

Recruitment Figures

And this is where the latest recruitment figures assume significance.

The National Conference came to power in 2024 after promising to review the controversial reservation policy. The issue had already become a major source of anxiety among open-merit candidates, particularly in the Kashmir Valley.

Yet nearly two years later, the controversy has only intensified.

The latest trigger was the appointment of 55 officers to the Jammu and Kashmir Administrative Service and the J&K Accounts (Gazetted) Service.

Of those 55 officers, only 10 came from the Kashmir Valley.

That gives Kashmir a share of roughly 18 per cent.

The remaining 45 officers, or about 82 per cent, were from outside the Valley.

This becomes particularly significant when compared with the regional population. Kashmir accounts for more than half of Jammu and Kashmir's population. Peoples Conference chief Sajad Lone has put the Valley's population share at about 56 per cent.

In other words, a region with roughly 56 per cent of the population received only 18 per cent of the appointments in this particular batch.

Lone described the situation as “recruitment apartheid”.

The expression is politically loaded, but the figures behind his criticism require an answer.

There is another revealing number within the same recruitment exercise. Of the 28 Junior Scale Jammu and Kashmir Administrative Service officers, only four reportedly came from Kashmir.

The concern is therefore not confined to reservation certificates. Similar questions have arisen over recruitment to other government institutions.

Earlier recruitment to the Jammu and Kashmir Police had already generated controversy over the regional composition of successful candidates.

Figures cited in the public debate over the 2022 J&K Police Sub-Inspector recruitment suggested that roughly 79 per cent of selected candidates came from the Jammu region, while the Kashmir Valley accounted for only about 17 per cent.

If those figures are examined against the Valley's share of the population, the disparity becomes difficult to overlook.

The pattern was alleged to have continued in subsequent police recruitment.

Figures cited for police constable recruitment during 2025-26 put the share of candidates from the Kashmir Valley at only around 15 to 20 per cent.

Once again, this was against a Valley population share generally put at well above half of the Union Territory's population.

Consider these figures together.

In reservation certificates, Jammu accounts for 86 per cent, against Kashmir's 14 per cent.

In the latest batch of 55 administrative and accounts officers, Kashmir accounts for only 18 per cent.

In the 2022 Police Sub-Inspector recruitment figures cited in the current debate, Kashmir's share was around 17 per cent, compared with about 79 per cent for Jammu.

And in police constable recruitment figures cited for 2025-26, the Valley's share was reportedly only 15 to 20 per cent.

One recruitment exercise can produce an unusual result. Even two recruitment exercises can be affected by the number of applicants, qualifications, category composition and performance of candidates.

But when figures from different recruitment exercises begin pointing broadly in the same direction, the government cannot merely ask people to ignore them.

PDP leader Iltija Mufti has described what she sees as the “institutional weeding” of Kashmiris from government jobs and the bureaucracy. She has also argued that “merit is being apartheidised” in Jammu and Kashmir.

These are strong political allegations. But the way to answer them is not through counter-slogans. The government should answer with comprehensive data.

It should publish region-wise recruitment figures covering several years.

How many candidates from Jammu and Kashmir applied for each recruitment examination? How many qualified at every stage? How many were selected under open merit? How many entered through reserved categories? What was the domicile and regional distribution of successful candidates?

Without such information, suspicion will continue to grow.

The latest appointments should therefore not be viewed in isolation.

For many Kashmiris, they are being seen alongside the reservation figures, earlier police recruitments and the declining share of open-merit seats. Together, these developments are creating a perception that the Valley's presence in the administrative machinery is steadily being reduced.

That perception carries serious political consequences.

Government employment has traditionally occupied an important place in Jammu and Kashmir's economy. The private sector remains limited. For thousands of educated young people, government recruitment is one of the few avenues for secure professional employment.

The bureaucracy is also more than an employment provider. It is the permanent machinery of governance.

If a region containing a majority or near-majority of the population finds itself increasingly underrepresented in that machinery, the issue inevitably becomes political.

This is why the present controversy cannot be reduced to a fight between open-merit candidates and disadvantaged communities.

Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, OBCs and economically weaker people have legitimate claims to affirmative action. Their rights should not be weakened.

But social justice should not produce another form of exclusion.

Transparency: Need of the Hour

A reservation system must be capable of protecting historically disadvantaged groups while also maintaining fairness between regions and ensuring reasonable space for merit.

The National Conference has a special responsibility in this regard. The party sought votes in 2024 on the promise that it would defend the rights and interests of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. It also promised to review the reservation policy.

A Cabinet Sub-Committee was subsequently constituted to examine the issue. But the matter has dragged on while recruitment processes have continued.

That delay has fuelled frustration among young people who expected the elected government to act. The National Conference cannot invoke regional concerns during elections and then appear helpless when those very concerns arise in government recruitment.

Nor can it indefinitely shift responsibility elsewhere.

If the elected government believes the reservation structure is unfair, it must say clearly what changes it wants. If its powers are limited, it must tell people precisely where those limitations lie. And if it believes the present system is fair, it should publish the data necessary to demonstrate that.

The figures already available demand a serious public discussion.

86 per cent against 14 per cent in reservation certificates cannot be treated as an insignificant statistic.

92.5 per cent of ST certificates going to Jammu cannot simply be overlooked.

Nor can the fact that 91.3 per cent of EWS certificates were issued in Jammu.

When Kashmir receives only 10 of 55 appointments, or about 18 per cent, in a major civil-service recruitment batch, people will naturally ask questions.

And when figures cited from earlier police recruitment exercises place Kashmir's share at around 17 per cent, followed by a reported 15 to 20 per cent in subsequent constable selections, those questions become still more pressing.

No single percentage proves a deliberate conspiracy against Kashmiris.

But a series of large disparities certainly establishes the need for investigation, transparency and corrective action where necessary.

The government should therefore release a comprehensive white paper on recruitment and reservation in Jammu and Kashmir.

It should provide at least a decade of region-wise and category-wise data covering government appointments, professional education and reservation certificates. Only then can the public determine whether the current disparity is temporary, demographic, category-driven, or structural.

Until that happens, the sense of alienation will continue to deepen.

Slowly but steadily, Kashmiris fear that their space within the administrative system is shrinking. They see their representation in important institutions declining while a reservation structure heavily weighted towards categories concentrated in another region continues to expand.

Whether this amounts to deliberate institutional exclusion, as opposition leaders allege, must ultimately be established through evidence. But the statistical disparities themselves are real enough to require answers.

The crucial question now is whether regional political parties will fight for a reservation system that protects social justice while ensuring regional fairness or accept the existing arrangement as a fait accompli.

They faced a similar test after the abrogation of Article 370, an issue they once described as fundamental to Jammu and Kashmir's political existence.

Today, another question confronts them.

If Kashmiris steadily lose their share in government employment and their presence in the institutions that administer the region, what will political representation alone ultimately be worth?