Muzaffarabad Diary: Is October 4 Accord Replica of Karachi Agreement?

Once again, the date October 4 has assumed symbolic weight in the political memory of Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir (PaJK). The region, long at the crossroads of competing sovereignties, witnessed on that day the signing of a 25-point accord that many are hailing as a breakthrough—but some people see as a veiled extension of the 1949 Karachi Agreement, a document that effectively subordinated PaJK’s administration to Islamabad.

The echoes of the past are unmistakable. Just as the Karachi Agreement was concluded without broad public consultation and handed over many powers, besides defence, foreign affairs, and communications, to Pakistan’s Ministry of Kashmir Affairs, the October 4, 2025, arrangement appears to mark another moment when local autonomy bends under federal oversight.

The accord emerged from six days of extraordinary tension. Beginning on September 29, a region-wide protest spearheaded by the Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC) paralysed civic life across PaJK. For five days, the territory remained under lockdown, followed by a complete communication blackout that lasted nearly a week. Clashes at three separate locations left 15 people dead—12 civilians and three policemen—and hundreds injured, yet the protests swelled rather than subsided.

The JAAC, a coalition of traders, students, and civic groups, had rallied around grievances that had festered for years: high electricity tariffs despite local hydropower generation, inadequate health infrastructure, widespread corruption, and Islamabad’s persistent encroachment into the region’s fiscal and administrative affairs. By the time talks began, tempers were raw and faith in the political class had evaporated.

Against this backdrop, the October 4 Accord was signed in Muzaffarabad between the Awami Action Committee, the Government of Pakistan, and the Government of PaJK. The 25-point document outlines reforms ranging from governance restructuring to fiscal oversight.

Key Provisions of Agreement

A central provision establishes a six-member legal committee—two representatives each from Pakistan, PaJK, and the Awami Action Committee—to review the long-disputed seats in the PaJK Assembly reserved for refugees from Jammu and Kashmir settled in Pakistan, commonly referred to as “external constituencies.” Until the committee submits its report, the ministries, privileges, and allocated development funds for these externally elected members are suspended.

The PaJK cabinet is to be capped at 20 ministers, and the number of administrative secretaries cannot exceed the same figure. Within 15 days, the government must issue a Health Card that guarantees citizens free medical treatment at designated hospitals in Pakistan. Each district is promised MRI and CT scan facilities, a commitment that—if implemented—could ease the chronic health disparity between the region and the rest of Pakistan.

To upgrade the fragile power infrastructure, the Government of Pakistan will release 10 billion rupees, while new divisional education boards will be created in Poonch and Muzaffarabad, linked directly to the Federal Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education in Islamabad.

Judicial and administrative reforms also feature prominently. The Local Government Act of 1990 will be implemented within 90 days “in its true spirit.” The Accountability Bureau and Anti-Corruption Establishment will be merged, and PaJK’s Accountability Act brought in line with Pakistan’s National Accountability Bureau (NAB) laws—effectively bringing local oversight under Islamabad’s legal umbrella.

Other measures include plans for an international airport in Mirpur within the current fiscal year, the enforcement of a 2019 High Court verdict on hydropower project contracts, and a review of the transport policy regarding official vehicles. Property transfer taxes will be adjusted within three months to match Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, while land occupied by Mangla Dam-affected families will be regularised within 30 days. Feasibility studies for Greater Water Supply Schemes across ten districts are to be completed before the year’s end.

Controversial Clause

Perhaps the most contentious clause is the very first: all violent incidents and acts of vandalism during the protests will be prosecuted under anti-terrorism laws. Judicial commissions will be formed “where necessary,” but the blanket classification of protest-related violence as terrorism has raised alarms.

In effect, individuals on both sides—security personnel and protesters alike—will face terrorism charges for the violence that occurred between September 29 and October 3. Critics warn that this could provide the legal basis for a sweeping judicial crackdown against the Awami Action Committee, reminiscent of the post-May 9, 2023, actions against Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf activists inside Pakistan.

To oversee compliance, a Monitoring and Implementation Committee will be set up, comprising representatives from the federal government, the PaJK administration, and the Joint Awami Action Committee. It will resolve disputes, define timelines, and establish rules for execution. The committee is also empowered to review the privileges of judges, ministers, and senior officials.

From Pakistan’s side, Federal Minister for Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit-Baltistan Amir Maqam and Federal Minister for Parliamentary Affairs Tariq Fazal Chaudhry have been named members, while four additional appointees will be announced later. The presence of federal politicians rather than bureaucrats underscores Islamabad’s intention to maintain political—not merely administrative—control over the process.

Echoes of the Karachi Agreement

The parallels with the 1949 Karachi Agreement are striking. That historic pact—signed between the governments of Pakistan, PaJK, and the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference—quietly transferred most powers to Islamabad without legislative approval. The present accord, too, carries the risk of transforming PaJK’s semi-autonomous institutions into extensions of Pakistan’s federal apparatus.

Under the new framework, Pakistan’s NAB will conduct accountability proceedings in the region, effectively ending PaJK’s independent anti-corruption jurisdiction. The education sector, long proud of its self-regulated curriculum, will now fall under the Federal Board’s supervision, eroding one of the few remaining symbols of autonomy.

Given that the Minister for Kashmir Affairs will play a central role in implementing the agreement, many in Muzaffarabad fear that the ministry’s shadow—diminished for a time—will once again loom large over local governance.

The accord’s announcement was greeted with relief in some quarters, exhaustion in others. The Awami Action Committee declared October 7 a “Thanksgiving Day,” claiming the deal represented a victory for people's power.

Yet beneath the jubilation lies anxiety. Many political observers believe the accord effectively legitimises Islamabad’s interference, consolidating control rather than devolving it.

The episode has also laid bare the weakness of traditional political parties. During the six days of unrest, mainstream politicians were conspicuously absent. Only two regional ministers appeared alongside Pakistan’s representatives during the negotiations. The vacuum allowed a new generation of leaders—mostly civic activists rather than career politicians—to step into the limelight.

Among them are Khwaja Mehran of Dadyal, who gained widespread recognition despite belonging to a community scarcely present in the area; Umar Nazir Kashmiri, Shaukat Nawaz Mir, Sardar Aman, and Raja Ghulam Mujtaba, each of whom has challenged entrenched dynasties and tribal patronage networks that long defined PaJK politics.

This realignment may prove the most enduring legacy of the uprising. The movement has awakened a new political consciousness that transcends kinship and regional loyalties, once the bedrock of PaJK’s electoral landscape.

Supporters of the accord argue that it delivers tangible relief: infrastructure funds, healthcare expansion, and administrative reform. Yet its critics counter that these come at a steep constitutional price. By aligning local laws with federal statutes and embedding Islamabad’s representatives in enforcement bodies, the agreement subtly but firmly redraws the lines of authority.

The broader implication is clear: PaJK’s governance is being recentralised, not liberalised. The language of partnership masks a deeper imbalance of power, one that places the region’s political evolution once again under federal supervision.

Seventy-six years after the October crisis in 1947, and seventy-six years after the Karachi Agreement of 1949, the cycle appears to have come full circle. History, as the saying goes, does not repeat itself—but it often rhymes.

The October 2025 accord may bring temporary calm, but its longer-term impact could well define the trajectory of Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir for years to come: between the promise of reform and the peril of renewed subordination.