From the targeted killing of Hamas political chief Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July 2024 to the recent assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the US and Israel have always believed in a security doctrine where eliminating the leader takes the centrestage.
The doctrine leans on a familiar playbook: remove the head, and the body will wither, and that undercuts its capacity to fight.
Many security experts have, however, opposed this doctrine of decapitation. They point out that removing a single leader rarely eliminates a movement’s underlying drivers. The killings of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Col Muammar Gaddafi in Libya warn of how regime removal can unleash fragmentation, local militias, and enduring instability.
Targeted killings have become part of the US and Israeli strategic vocabulary. Israel’s campaign against Hamas leadership included long-time figures such as Yahya Sinwar and Ismail Haniyeh, whose deaths in successive strikes significantly disrupted the group’s command hierarchy. These operations reflect a belief that eliminating central figures reduces operational coherence and saps morale.
The assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei marked a historic escalation. It was the first time in decades that a sitting head of state was directly killed by a foreign military in modern conflict. The operation was reportedly a joint US-Israeli effort leveraging deep intelligence networks to target him and other senior officials in Tehran.
“Targeting top leaders has strategic value in disrupting enemy planning,” says Dr Jonathan Schanzer, senior vice president at a Washington think tank focused on counterterrorism.
“But history shows that it rarely ends the conflict by itself. It often creates a leadership vacuum that can be worse than the original problem.”
In Iraq after 2003, the removal of Saddam Hussein dismantled central authority but unleashed sectarian warfare and militia domination. In Libya, the killing of Gaddafi ended an autocrat’s rule but triggered tribal rivalries and competing armed groups that persist years later.
Even within militant movements, leadership losses can lead to unexpected outcomes.
Khaled Meshaal, a long-time leader of Hamas, survived Israeli assassination attempts in the 1990s and went on to head the political bureau from abroad. The movement adapted, relocating parts of its leadership to Qatar, where it now functions as a collective council.
British way: Degrade, Isolate, Negotiate
By contrast, the British security doctrine, as applied most notably in Northern Ireland, embodied a different logic. Rather than immediately targeting the leadership for elimination, London sought to weaken the ecosystem that sustained armed groups.
This approach aimed to tire opponents: eliminate people around leadership, isolate hardliners, engage more moderate or pliable intermediaries, and create openings for political dialogue.
The objective is not spectacle but settlement, measured in political terms rather than battlefield metrics. After decades of conflict, the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 emerged from that long effort. The result was not the disappearance of political dissent but its channeling into constitutional politics.
Historians and practitioners describe this strategy as slow and unglamorous, but ultimately more conducive to lasting peace.
“The British strategy combined security pressure with political strategy designed to absorb adversaries into constitutional politics,” says Paul Bew, professor at King’s College London.
This model also emphasizes patience and sustained political engagement. Rather than eliminating leaders, it works to soften their position and bring them toward negotiation.
Similar dynamics played out in South Asia. In India’s northeast, the 1986 Mizoram Accord with rebel leader Laldenga brought him into mainstream political life as chief minister. The agreement helped end a protracted insurgency without resorting to his elimination or prolonged military confrontation.
In Kashmir, the 1975 accord with Sheikh Abdullah effectively re-integrated a powerful regional leader into the system and abandoned the movement for the right to self-determination. Analysts say that this kept Kashmir peaceful till 1987, when local elections were massively rigged and revived the movement for the right to self-determination.
While neither deal was easy or immediate, both illustrate how negotiated absorption can dampen conflict drivers rather than feed them.
“Durable peace requires political accommodation, not just security dominance,” notes G Parthasarathy, a former Indian diplomat. “Force can create space but cannot substitute for negotiation.”
Lessons and Risks
The divergence between decapitation and dialogue has important implications for how states address insurgencies and extremist networks. Decapitation offers immediate tactical impact but often at the cost of long-term instability.
When leaders are removed, movements do not necessarily collapse; they may splinter into factions that are harder to track and negotiate with. These groups can adopt more extreme positions in a scramble to assert relevance.
The US Department of Defense’s own research suggests that leadership decapitation is most effective when the group lacks institutional depth. When networks are decentralised, killing one leader has a limited impact on overall cohesion.
Yet the expanding use of advanced technologies, from drones to precision missiles, has made targeted eliminations easier. The killing of Khamenei, a rare act against a head of state, reflects this trend. But it also raises pertinent questions about escalation, regional stability, and the ethical dimensions of war.
Analysts warn that removing a figure like Khamenei does not automatically translate into regime collapse. Iran’s political system diffuses power across clerical institutions, the armed forces, and the security apparatus, making it resilient to the loss of an individual leader.
The record from multiple theatres suggests that a singular focus on decapitation can yield tactical victories without strategic closure. Middle East expert Brandon Prins notes that “once you remove the marquee figure, you often end up with multiple emergent leaders who have to be dealt with in different ways.”
By contrast, strategies that combine security pressure with political engagement can create space for negotiated settlements that reduce violence over time. These approaches require patience and willingness to compromise qualities often in short supply when governments seek quick results and political capital.
As conflicts from Palestine to South Asia persist, policymakers must weigh the allure of dramatic military actions against the reality that ending conflict often involves hard, sustained political work.
The history of insurgency and counterinsurgency suggests that killing a leader may weaken a movement, but true resolution comes from inclusion, negotiation, and durable political frameworks.
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