Gilgit Baltistan’s third legislative assembly has recently completed its term, and a caretaker set-up is now in place until the next election is held. Parliamentary governance in Gilgit Baltistan only began in 2009, through an executive order issued under the signature of the President of Pakistan, Asif Ali Zardari, in his first tenure.
Through this presidential ordinance, the region was given the status of a provisional province within Pakistan. Nine years later, yet another order was issued in 2018, altering the earlier framework, and the structure imposed under Order 2018 continues to govern Gilgit Baltistan today.
From the partition of the subcontinent until 2009, no permanent system of government could be established in Gilgit Baltistan. When one looks back, it becomes evident that Gilgit was liberated on November 1, 1947, while the Baltistan region achieved liberation by August 14, 1948. Gilgit remained an independent state from November 1-16, 1947.
On November 16, the territory was placed under the administration of the then North-West Frontier Province, now called Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Sardar Alam Khan was appointed as political agent in Gilgit, and the Frontier Crimes Regulation, known as FCR, was enforced. One year later, Baltistan, including Skardu and other newly liberated areas, was absorbed under the same administrative arrangement.
About one and a half years after the introduction of FCR, the Karachi Agreement was signed on April 28, 1949, between the government of Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir and the Federation of Pakistan. Through this agreement, the earlier status of the region was restored by removing it from the administration of NWFP and declaring it a part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir.
However, it was kept administratively separate from Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir, and the region came to be known as the Northern Areas. The FCR regime remained intact. This mode of governance continued until 1971. During this period, Pakistan President Ayub Khan held elections in 1960 under the Basic Democracy system, but local administrative bodies could not function effectively.
In 1971, Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto abolished the FCR and ended the role of political agent in the Northern Areas. Bhutto also established the Northern Areas Advisory Council, which functioned for four years. In 1975, the Advisory Council was reconstituted as the Northern Areas Council with sixteen members. Eight were elected by the people of Gilgit Baltistan, while eight were appointed by the federal government in Islamabad.
The Minister for Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas was designated as the chief executive of this council. After the dismissal of Bhutto’s government and the imposition of martial law by General Zia-ul-Haq, the Northern Areas were declared an E-Zone. In 1981, the Pakistan Citizenship Act of 1951 was extended to the Northern Areas, giving residents recognition as Pakistani citizens.
In 1993, Chief Justice Abdul Majeed Malik of the High Court of Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir ordered the government to revoke the Karachi Agreement of 1949 and assume administrative control over the Northern Areas. He directed that the Northern Areas be given representation in the legislative assembly and quotas in government employment.
However, instead of implementing that verdict, the government, under Sardar Abdul Qayyum, the then prime minister, along with the Federation of Pakistan, challenged the decision in the Supreme Court of Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir.
The Supreme Court ruled that, as Gilgit Baltistan was not mentioned anywhere in the 1974 Act that governs PaJK, administrative transfer could not be enforced. The court also held that the High Court did not possess jurisdiction to hear any reference against the state of Pakistan.
In 1994, during the government of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, Gilgit Baltistan received its first formal governance order, enabling judicial reforms and administrative restructuring. Under this order, the Chief Court of Gilgit Baltistan was established, and the office of Deputy Chief Executive was introduced.
The Chief Executive of the Northern Areas remained the Minister for Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas, and the Deputy Chief Executive only possessed powers delegated by the Chief Executive. No independent authority was defined for him in the order.
Another important development in 1994 was the petition filed in the Supreme Court of Pakistan by the Al-Jehad Trust regarding the constitutional status and rights of the Northern Areas. The petition demanded protection of fundamental rights, restoration of the right to self-governance, representation in Pakistan’s parliament, or, at a minimum, freedom for residents to form their own elected assembly, control their own administrative affairs, and determine their political future.
The petition also demanded that no tax be collected until rights were granted and that if the region was not to be treated as part of Pakistan, then its boundary should be demarcated and interference halted.
A five-member bench of the Supreme Court of Pakistan heard the case and, in 1999, delivered a landmark judgment. It ruled that since residents of the Northern Areas hold Pakistani legal documents and pay taxes, they are citizens of Pakistan and therefore entitled to full constitutional and political rights enjoyed by all other citizens. The Supreme Court instructed the parliament to decide the appropriate governing system for the region and bring reforms within six months.
After this decision, the government of Nawaz Sharif upgraded the Northern Areas Advisory Council into a Legislative Council and granted it powers to legislate on forty-seven local subjects, mostly municipal in nature. For the first time, the office of the Speaker was introduced to the council. Earlier, from 1975 to 1999, council meetings were chaired by the Minister for Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas.
When General Pervez Musharraf took over, he continued these reforms, and elections for the Legislative Council were held again in November 1999 and 2004. In 2005, a Court of Appeal was established, which was upgraded to the Chief Appellate Court in 2007. This court consisted of three judges, and its chief judge was usually appointed from outside Gilgit Baltistan. In December 2007, the Legislative Council was elevated to the status of Legislative Assembly. Despite these reforms, control remained firmly with the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas, whose minister acted as chairman of the system.
Two years later, in 2009, the Pakistan Peoples’ Party government introduced a governance framework closely resembling that of Azad Jammu and Kashmir. Under Executive Order 2009, the name Northern Areas was officially changed to Gilgit Baltistan. A Legislative Assembly and a Gilgit Baltistan Council were established.
For the first time, the region celebrated a joint Independence Day on November 1. Earlier, Gilgit observed November 1, and Skardu observed August 14 as separate days of liberation.
Under this order, the Gilgit Baltistan Assembly received some legislative powers, but final authority remained with the Prime Minister of Pakistan. For the first time, the terms minister and ministry were introduced in Gilgit Baltistan, replacing earlier advisor positions which were appointed by the Chief Executive and approved by the Minister for Kashmir Affairs.
The 2009 order declared that only holders of Gilgit-Baltistan domicile would be considered citizens of the region, and the Pakistan Citizenship Act ceased to apply. Appointment of judges remained under the federal Minister for Kashmir Affairs, and the chief judge of the Appellate Court could still be appointed from outside. Pakistan continued to appoint judges from other provinces.
After nine years, this framework was replaced by the Gilgit Baltistan Order 2018. Residents had hoped that the new system would grant internal legislative autonomy. Instead, the order reiterated that all authority would continue to originate from the Prime Minister of Pakistan, and even those powers earlier granted to the assembly were withdrawn.
This order was challenged in the Supreme Appellate Court of Gilgit Baltistan, which annulled it. The Gilgit Baltistan Bar Council then again approached the Supreme Court of Pakistan. On January 17, 2019, a seven-member bench headed by Chief Justice Saqib Nisar delivered judgment, reviewing the federal proposal of the Gilgit Baltistan Order 2019.
The Supreme Court directed the government to implement the 109-page order within two weeks. The verdict reaffirmed the 1999 Al-Jehad Trust ruling and ordered that rights be granted to residents of both Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan.
In the preface of Order 2019, the government of Pakistan stated that Gilgit Baltistan could be granted provisional provincial status until the final settlement of the Kashmir issue, and that the order would serve temporarily to provide equal rights comparable to Pakistan’s provinces.
The Supreme Court allowed two weeks for government implementation. Extensions were sought, and a committee headed by Farogh Naseem was formed to refine the draft for parliamentary approval. On April 30, 2020, the federal government asked the court for amendments to enable the establishment of a caretaker government in Gilgit Baltistan and conduct elections, since the assembly term was ending on June 23, 2020, and legislation under Order 2019 had not taken place.
The Supreme Court extended the Election Act 2017 to Gilgit Baltistan and ordered the formation of a caretaker government under Order 2019. However, the government instead proceeded under the Election Act and later held elections in 2020 under the 2018 framework. Thus, even today, governance continues under Order 2018.
Order 2019 contained several judicial reforms. Appointment of judges was to be made through a judicial commission, removing authority from the Minister for Kashmir Affairs and the Prime Minister, who continued to control appointments under the 2009 and 2018 orders.
Order 2019 also proposed expanded lawmaking powers for Gilgit-Baltistan.
Unfortunately, the order has not been implemented to this day. The current caretaker government also functions under Order 2018, and unless the federal government decides otherwise, upcoming elections will be held under the same framework.
However, statements from some federal ministers suggest that a possible Twenty Eighth Amendment to the Constitution could grant representation to Gilgit Baltistan and Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir in key national institutions, especially fiscal distribution bodies. If that happens, there may finally be a change in the system of governance in Gilgit Baltistan.
Parties Contesting Elections in Gilgit Baltistan
1. Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI)
Position in previous assembly: Largest party in 2020, formed government.
Strengths:
Grassroots mobilisation generated during the last tenure still exists in segments.
Known for developmental claims in infrastructure and tourism expansion.
Youth support in urban GB remains notable.
Strong media-level messaging capacity.
Weaknesses:
Internal splits after the disqualification of Khalid Khurshid.
Many former electables have left or are politically inactive.
Organisational coherence has reduced compared to 2020.
Requires rebuilding narrative and leadership unity.
2. Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP)
Position historically: Influential since the 2009 Order.
Strengths:
Has absorbed several defectors from PTI and PML-N which broadens its electoral footprint.
Seen as original initiator of GB’s formal legislative framework (Order 2009).
Strong leadership rapport in Skardu, Ghizer, Hunza.
Cadre-based structure gives it street-level campaign strength.
Weaknesses:
Governance delivery in past tenures remains debated.
Internal factional disagreements between old guard and newly joining electables.
Needs clear position on constitutional status for voter confidence.
3. Pakistan Muslim League (N)
Position previously: Formed the government in 2015, a major force before the PTI era.
Strengths:
Organised senior-level leadership with administrative experience.
Stable vote pockets in Gilgit, Diamer, Astore.
Seen by some as pro-development and pro-administrative order.
Weaknesses:
Gradual decline since 2020.
Multiple defections weakened constituency-level machinery.
Needs revival narrative and fresh public engagement.
4. Majlis-e-Wahdat-ul-Muslimeen (MWM)
Role: Religious-political organisation with influence in Shia-majority zones.
Strengths:
Strong ideological vote base in Skardu, Kargah, some GB-3 regions.
Coalition-friendly, often kingmaker-type actor.
Community mobilization capacity high.
Weaknesses:
Limited presence outside core belt.
Narrative mostly sectarian-community focused rather than governance-wide.
5. Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (F) — JUI-F
Role: Influential mainly in Diamer and Ghizer religious constituencies.
Strengths:
Madrassa network benefits mobilisation.
Stable traditional vote among conservative population.
Weaknesses:
Appeal outside core belt remains thin.
Vote share fluctuates depending on independent candidates.
6. Independents and Regional Electables
Role: Historically decisive — many win as independents and join later.
Strengths:
Personal influence, tribal networks and patronage define outcomes.
Often hold balance in formation of government.
Strong localised loyalty beyond party lines.
Weaknesses:
Lack unified provincial-level programme.
Vulnerable to post-poll pressures and shifting alliances.
Key Electoral Variables to Watch (Non-Predictive)
Defectors and electables — Their new loyalties may decide power configuration.
Constitutional promises — Parties talking clearly about status, rights, and governance could gain public trust.
Youth vote — High turnout among first-time voters can change constituency maths.
Caretaker neutrality perception — Credibility of elections depends on confidence in administration.
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