Jamaat-e-Islami, JDF and beyond: Reimagining Islamist politics in changing times

The ongoing public rupture within Jammu and Kashmir’s banned Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) is far more than an internal squabble over property or ideological purity. It represents a historic crossroads for a movement that has shaped the Valley’s socio-political landscape for over eight decades, and a potentially transformative opening for India’s long-term stabilisation strategy in Kashmir.

The dispute pits the old guard, symbolised by those led by the former JeI chief Ghulam Mohammad Bhat, against the potent new blood that has embraced electoral politics under the banner of the Justice and Development Front (JDF). While the immediate trigger is control over the Falah-e-Aam Trust (FAT) and other JeI-linked properties, the deeper contest is over whether the Jamaat’s political legacy will be defined by constitutional engagement or continued estrangement from the Indian state.

For New Delhi, this is not merely an internal matter of a banned organisation. It is a rare and time-sensitive opportunity to consolidate the gains of a patient, law-based approach to deradicalisation and mainstreaming. A sympathetic and strategic response can help the JDF, and the reformist constituency within the Jamaat that it represents, become a durable ally in the fight against Pakistan-inspired secessionism laced with an ‘Islamic touch’.

Conversely, a heavy-handed or dismissive approach risks pushing a willing partner back into the margins, where it could be more easily exploited by external forces.

From Militancy to Constitutional Politics

The Jamaat-e-Islami Jammu and Kashmir has historically been a cadre-based, disciplined organisation with deep roots in the Valley. Founded in 1942, it entered electoral politics in 1972, winning five assembly seats.

It was part of the Muslim United Front in the 1987 elections, which was rigged badly by the then National Conference-Congress combine that catalysed the armed insurgency of the 1990s. During the early years of militancy following the relentless pressure from the JKLF, Hizbul Mujahideen described itself as the armed wing of Jamaat, though this was never an official position.

The first major rupture in the Jamaat came in 1999, when Ghulam Mohammad Bhat, the newly elected Jamaat chief, publicly dissociated the organisation from armed militancy. This was a very brave move from Bhat, who faced mortal threats and intense pressure from Pakistan, yet he remained steadfast.

His decision created a deep divide, eventually leading hardliners like Syed Ali Shah Geelani to leave the fold. Bhat’s position was clear: the Jamaat must not be a tool in the hands of outside forces. I clearly remember my two consecutive meetings with Bhat sahib at the time wherein he candidly mentioned that he wants the Jamaat to operate within the geo-political realities on the ground and does not want Jamaat to be used and abused by Pakistan.

After the Pulwama attack in February 2019, the Ministry of Home Affairs banned the Jamat, once again, alleging involvement in activities prejudicial to internal security and links with militants. Although the government failed to prove any links between the insurgents and the Jamaat, the ban was extended for five years in February 2024. The government also took over hundreds of schools run by the Fallah-e-Aam Trust (FAT), an educational trust linked to the Jamaat and attached numerous properties.

The Emergence of the JDF: A Break from the Past

Following the ban, a considerable section of the Jamaat leadership began exploring a different path. In June 2024, the Central Advisory Council (Majlis-e-Shura) of the party, after deliberations with the Government of India, adopted ten decisions. Among these were a commitment to pursue all future activities through democratic and constitutional means, and the creation of a political front - the Justice and Democratic Front (JDF) - for electoral and political activities. Importantly, the document recording these decisions was signed by members of the Shura, including Ghulam Mohammad Bhat, who is now questioning the formation of JDF and its linkages to the Jamaat.

The JDF was formally launched in April 2025 and registered by the Election Commission of India in January 2026. In the 2024 Assembly elections, candidates backed by the Jamaat contested as independents. While none of them won, Sayar Ahmad Reshi in Kulgam secured over 25,000 votes and saved his deposit, signaling a reservoir of latent support in the Jamaat’s traditional bastions of south Kashmir.

The JDF has since positioned itself as a party committed to justice, development, and public welfare. It has participated in government-led initiatives such as the ‘Nasha Mukt J&K’ anti-drug march, alongside the Lieutenant Governor, demonstrating its willingness to work within the constitutional mainstream. Its leaders have publicly rejected “azadi” as a goal and affirmed their commitment to operate strictly under the Indian Constitution.

The Current Rupture: A Contest for the Jamaat’s Soul

The current crisis erupted when Ghulam Mohammad Bhat, the former chief of Jamaat, in a video statement, distanced the Jamaat from the JDF, asserting that the banned organisation has no links with any political party. He argued that since the Jamaat has accepted the ban, it cannot participate in political activities, and it should pursue legal recourse against the ban rather than engage in electoral politics.

Bhat also accused the JDF of attempting to take over JeI properties, particularly the FAT office in Srinagar, which he insisted should remain delinked from politics.

The JDF faction, led by the de-facto amir, Ghulam Qadir Wani and Ahmadullah Parray Makki, the deputy, hit back, claiming that the panel was constituted with the permission of the government and had the support of the Majlis-e-Shura. They pointed out that Bhat himself was a signatory to the decisions that created the JDF and accused him of not pursuing the legal case against the ban, despite claiming to do so. They also denied any forcible takeover of FAT property, stating that a tenancy agreement had been signed in 2024 for a portion of the property.

The dispute has drawn in external actors. PDP president Mehbooba Mufti jumped in with a statement calling for due process and restraint in dealing with the attached properties. The JDF pilloried Mufti for interference and accused her of having a vested interest in keeping the Jamaat’s vote bank dependent on it.

This political dimension adds a layer of complexity: the PDP and other regional parties have historically benefited from Jamaat-sympathiser votes, and a consolidated JDF could challenge their hegemony in south Kashmir, the region where Mufti’s party won in the past to propel its state-wide ambitions.

Why This Matters for India

The internal rift is not merely a family feud. It reflects a genuine and painful reckoning within a movement that once provided ideological cover for armed insurgency. The JDF represents the largest faction within the Jamaat that has concluded and endorsed its position that the only viable future lies in constitutional politics and democratic participation. Its leaders, many of whom spent years in jail or faced persecution, are taking significant personal and political risks by embracing the Indian Constitution.

For India, this is a strategic opportunity. A cornered, underground Jamaat is far more dangerous than an accepted one that is willing to work within the constitutional framework. The JDF’s emergence signals that a critical mass of the Jamaat’s cadre and sympathisers have abandoned the politics of boycott and separatism. If this constituency is given political space, it can become a bulwark against the renewed attempts to revive militancy and radicalization for now and also in the future.

Pakistan has historically used the Jamaat and its offshoots as potent instruments of its Kashmir policy. A failed JDF would vindicate the narrative that Indian democracy has no room for Kashmiri Islamists, and would strengthen the argument that violence is the only path. A successful, mainstreamed JDF, on the other hand, would be a powerful rebuke to that narrative.

Broadening the Base

The JDF’s electoral performance in 2024 was modest, and it faces an uphill battle to establish itself as a credible political force. To reach a wider audience within India, it must articulate a clear and positive vision with a concrete agenda for development, education, healthcare, and employment. It could represent and guide the aspirations of ordinary Kashmiris, not just religious or communal interests. It can also proactively seek dialogue with national political parties, media, and civil society. The JDF’s recent participation in the anti-drug march is a good start. It should expand its presence in local governance, community service, and welfare activities, building trust through tangible action rather than rhetoric.

The Government of India has a crucial role to play in ensuring that the JDF’s experiment succeeds. A policy of indifference or continued suspicion would be counterproductive. The government should engage with the JDF as a legitimate political actor, not the banned Jamaat.

JDF leaders and workers have faced threats and intimidation. The government must ensure their security and allow them to operate freely, without fear of harassment or arbitrary detention. It should also review the policy of property attachment and consider lifting the ban on Jamaat in a calibrated manner to allow the Jamaat to function as a lawful socio-religious and political organisation.

Conclusion: A Historic Opportunity

The Jamaat-e-Islami Jammu and Kashmir stands at a historic crossroads. The choices made by its leadership and the response of the Indian government will determine whether it remains a symbol of alienation and conflict or becomes a partner in peace and development. The JDF represents the most promising attempt yet by a very potent group within the Jamaat to completely break free from the cycle of violence and boycott as it openly and cordially embraces the Constitution.

For India, the path forward is to support the reformers, engage with the JDF, address legitimate grievances, and create an environment where constitutional politics can flourish. This is not a concession to separatism; it is a strategic investment in peace. The defeat of foreign-sponsored secessionism and militancy in Kashmir will not come from military force alone. It will come from the steady, patient work of building a political order in which all Kashmiris, including those who once stood on the other side, have a stake.