On the evening of February 25, 2026, as the call to prayer from the lofty minarets of Al-Aqsa Mosque echoed across the skies of Jerusalem’s Old City announcing the time for iftar, a few hundred meters away in a courtyard where the Indian tricolor fluttered, members of the Ansari family sat with their eyes fixed on a television screen.
Barely a kilometer from this place, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi was addressing the Israeli Parliament, the Knesset.
The family is the custodian of a civilizational footprint of the pre-Partition Indian subcontinent that the world knows as Zawiya al-Hindiya.
Located only a few meters from Herod’s Gate, also known as Bab al-Zahra, in the sacred city of Jerusalem, the residents of this place had hoped that perhaps the Indian Prime Minister would also step into their historic courtyard. But Modi had other engagements in his schedule, in which there appeared to be no space for any Muslim symbol.
Zawiya al-Hindiya is a rare and unique site where the spiritual history of Muslims from the Indian subcontinent embraces Palestine. The courtyard is illuminated by the memory of the great 12th–13th century Sufi saint Baba Farid Ganj Shakar, who, according to tradition, spent 40 days here in retreat and meditation.
Although Baba Farid’s shrine lies in Pakistan’s Punjab province, the absence of diplomatic relations between Pakistan and Israel has effectively left India since 1947 as the sole inheritor and guardian of this shared heritage of the subcontinent.
In 1992, four years after India restored full diplomatic relations with Israel, the then Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee visited Jerusalem and paid his respects at this khanqah.
Since then, almost every Indian minister or dignitary traveling to Israel and Palestine has made Zawiya al-Hindiya a mandatory stop on their itinerary. Even the current foreign minister, S. Jaishankar, has visited the place three times. In diplomatic circles, it is often referred to as an “Indian jewel” in Jerusalem, bearing the inscription:
While ignoring this “Indian jewel” in Jerusalem and instead spending time with the actors of the Israeli television series Fauda gave a clear message a day before the US-Israel jointly launched war on Iran.
No one in New Delhi has been able to clearly explain why Modi traveled to Israel when it was actually Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu who was expected to visit New Delhi.
All this was done despite the fact that clouds of war were already gathering over Iran.
Purpose of Visit
Experts say the basic purpose of the visit was to help Netanyahu break out of his growing global isolation and to seek a recommendation for himself from US President Donald Trump, who has stalled trade agreements and is putting pressure on Modi’s close ally, the industrialist Gautam Adani.
Just a day after Modi returned to New Delhi, Israel, together with the United States, not only declared war on Iran but also killed several top political and military leaders, including Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who had gathered to finalize the framework of a Nuclear Agreement with Washington under Omani mediation.
These attacks have created an uncomfortable diplomatic situation for India.
There was a time when, in February 1979, as war broke out between China and Vietnam, India’s then foreign minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, was on an official visit to Peking, now Beijing. In protest, he cut short the visit and returned to New Delhi, registering India’s opposition to the war.
India, however, has not yet even condemned this unprovoked attack on Iran, despite having deep bilateral relations with Tehran.
When Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi died in a helicopter crash in 2024, India declared a day of national mourning. Prime Minister Modi said he was deeply saddened by the sudden death of the Iranian President and that India stood with Iran in that moment of grief.
Observers now ask what changed between 2024 and 2026 that India could not even utter a few words of sympathy for Iran. In fact, the Foreign Ministry reportedly issued a formal memo advising Indian diplomats not to visit Iranian embassies to sign condolence books.
When the Congress party and other opposition groups raised an outcry, Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri visited the Iranian embassy in New Delhi and signed the condolence register.
In the same week, an Iranian naval vessel returning from India was struck by a US torpedo in international waters, killing dozens on board. The ship was unarmed and had traveled to India at New Delhi’s invitation to participate in the International Fleet Review before the US-Israel war on Iran began.
Former Indian military officers and diplomats described the incident as a strategic embarrassment for the Indian government and a blow to its regional credibility.
Surprise for Strategic Community
India’s cold response has surprised the country’s strategic community, even those closer to the government and major opposition parties. After all, Iran was not merely an acquaintance of India. For decades, it had been among India’s closest partners.
India has long projected itself as a guarantor of security in the Indian Ocean. Yet in this case, it was the Sri Lankan navy, not India, that moved to rescue the crew of the vessel.
Many in New Delhi believe that what has changed between 2024 and 2026 is the “Operation Sindoor.” They believe it has become a bitter reality for India. They argue that two consecutive failures of India’s PSLV rocket launches, the loss of expensive military-capable satellites, the lack of independent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance resources, and the urgent need for standoff weapons, drones, sensors, and air defense systems in any new conflict have all become writing on the wall. This reality is forcing India to take sides and appear to remain closer to Israel.
It has also become evident that in West Asia, India is no longer a neutral actor but part of the Israel-United Arab Emirates alignment. Seen in this light, the sudden three-hour visit to New Delhi on Jan. 19 by the UAE ruler Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed now appears less mysterious.
Palestinian leaders and several Israeli analysts also described Modi’s visit as premature, a judgment that seemed confirmed by the attack on Iran, which now appears like a tacit endorsement of those strikes.
The current situation has also exposed the limits of India’s claim to leadership of the Global South.
India’s ambition to present itself as a voice of the Global South, particularly through forums such as BRICS and the G-20, depends heavily on perceptions of strategic autonomy and moral credibility. Yet its silence on Iran and its visible tilt toward Israel have raised doubts among many developing countries about whether New Delhi can still speak for the broader interests of the Global South.
For India, open hostility with either Iran or Saudi Arabia would be a complex and costly proposition. Historically, India has maintained strong ties with Iran and invested in projects such as the Chabahar Port.
A deeper strategic embrace of Israel may increase pressure on New Delhi not to become part of an anti-Iran axis. The price of maintaining relations with Tehran may now rise, and India’s West Asia policy may be viewed less as “multi-alignment” and more as a gradual shift toward Israel.
Parallels with Norway of 1979
Palestinian leader Ahmad Majdalani recalls that India could have used its credibility in Israel for peace, much as Norway did in the early 1980s.
When oil was discovered in Norway in 1979, pressure mounted on Oslo to supply oil to Israel. Norwegian leaders consulted Yasser Arafat, and the Palestinian leader reportedly advised Norway to use that position to push Israel into secret negotiations with the Palestinians.
Those efforts eventually culminated fourteen years later in the Oslo Accords, which gave international recognition to the two-state formula, enabled Arafat’s return to Palestine, and paved the way for Israeli withdrawal from parts of the West Bank and Gaza.
Analysts note that India’s political weight is far greater than Norway’s. It has the capacity to talk to all sides — provided it chooses its symbols carefully.
After all, diplomacy is shaped not only by agreements but also by the places a leader chooses to visit and the platforms from which he chooses to speak.
By ignoring Zawiya al-Hindiya and prioritizing the Knesset, Modi did not project the image of a leader striving for lasting peace, Palestinian dignity, or leadership of the Global South.
In short, India’s global standing has suffered considerably during this conflict.
Even for those like Kanwal Sibal, Maj. Gen. G. D. Bakshi, who for years had been among Modi’s admirers, now argues that India has chosen the wrong side.
The country had come to believe it was an emerging and indispensable global power, and its leaders had lived in that illusion for more than a decade while teaching the same lesson to the public through the media.
But President Donald Trump and events of the past year have brought India back to the world of reality.
Rather than flattering Israel to offset global humiliation, India would do better to adopt modesty at home and in its neighborhood, rebuild relations with regional countries, search for peaceful solutions to unresolved disputes, and rein in the shouting television channels and their anchors.
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