Al Yamamah Palace in Riyadh housed the signing of a document on September 17, 2025, which could very well be remembered as a landmark moment in the twenty-first-century geopolitics-history. The Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA) between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan draws itself masterfully into the theatre of global realignment, dropping a stone into the pond, sending ripple effects from the Strait of Hormuz to the Himalayas and beyond. Will it be as Friedrich Hegel said, ‘March of God on Earth’.
Analysts describe the pact as Pakistan's "most important formal defense pact in decades," binding combined financial power and nuclear capability together in a unique regional alignment. The Saudi Press Department stated after the pact, which is being seen as one combining financial power and nuclear capability in a unique regional alignment, that "any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both."
The pact comes at a time when the Middle East's strategic landscape is being shaken by unprecedented incidents during the last two years, most notably Israel's widening war with Hamas and its allies, which has transcended the borders of Gaza, with the more recent September 9 attack by Israel on Doha, capital of Qatar, which borders Saudi Arabia, becoming a major catalyst.
The pure essence of the deal was aptly captured in a tweet by Saudi Arabia's Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman: "KSA and Pakistan [are now] one front against any aggressor, always and forever".
While the full text of the deal remains classified, officials from both sides have revealed its broad contours. A senior Saudi official told Reuters that "this is a comprehensive defensive agreement that encompasses all military means," from conventional forces to potential nuclear cooperation and intelligence sharing. Defense industry collaboration, technology transfer, military co-production, capacity-building, and training are also included.
The new deal is tied to a history of deep Pakistan-Saudi cooperation. Saudi Arabia recognized Pakistan's independence in August 1947, and the 1951 "Treaty of Friendship" established decades of strategic partnership. Since 1967, Pakistani forces have trained over 8,000 Saudi military personnel, with formal military cooperation agreements solidified in 1982.
For cash-strapped Pakistan, the agreement opens a crucial lifeline in terms of economics. Saudi Arabia will soon emerge as Islamabad's biggest outside financier in the coming fiscal year 2025-2026, contributing over $6 billion through loans and deposits. For visionary Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, this strategic move is an intent to develop a long vision by internationalizing security for his kingdom and projecting power amid growing uncertainties about American reliability.
The shadow of regional conflicts - from Yemen's Houthi rebels to the Iranian expansion-hangs above this pact. For years, Pakistan found itself walking the diplomatic high-wire in the region. Riyadh, seeking to rope in Pakistani troops into its coalition against the Iran-supported Houthis, was met with careful refusal from Islamabad. Pakistan opted for neutrality because it is home to a significant Shia minority and does not wish to increase tensions with neighbouring Iran.
Iran went ahead and backed the new defense pact between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan because even though the SMDA pact does not necessarily translate into Pakistani boots on the ground in Yemen immediately, the message is clear: a direct attack on Saudi critical infrastructure, like the 2019 Abqaiq oil facility strike by Houthis, could now invoke a response from a nuclear-armed state with a huge conventional army.
But this shift in diplomacy here is not all that sudden, as it is believed that Pakistan had tacitly supported Iran when the latter was attacked by Israel.
The pact also rattles both the Pentagon and Israel. Security analysts in Washington point to pre-existing American concerns about Pakistan's ballistic missile development. Seven times during the period of Biden's administration between 2021 and 2025, Pakistanis, individuals, and firms were sanctioned over allegations of ballistic missile development. To put it simply: the pact will lead to a re-jig of global equations.
China appears to be the major beneficiary of this agreement.
The SMDA constitutes a security partnership between two major regional partners of China—one an energy supplier (Saudi Arabia), and the other a crucial BRI corridor (Pakistan). Therefore, this fits into the larger Chinese scheme of establishing a network of interdependent partnerships all across Eurasia, securing the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor from possible destabilization, and boxing in India, the prime rival of China in the region.
The agreement, however, has been received across the spectrum in Washington and London with anxiety. It signifies the failure of a decades-old policy to keep Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in separate US-managed silos. A feared chain reaction: other Gulf Arab states fading away into this emerging axis, ultimately undercutting the US security architecture established since 1945.
The agreement illustrates a trend according to which Gulf states attempt to diversify their security partnerships due to decreasing trust in US security guarantees. These sets of apprehensions have been aggravated by the Israeli attack on Qatar and West Asian tensions involving Iran, Lebanon, Yemen, and the Gaza crisis.
Moscow looks at this development with calculated glee. Russia has been trying to get close to Saudi Arabia through OPEC coordination and to Pakistan with energy deals and military exercises. This pact further undercuts the US-led order and creates a more complicated web of alliances, which Russia can use to its advantage. It is pulling Saudi Arabia away from Washington's orbit and is strengthening its anti-Western bloc without expending much in terms of resources.
President Erdogan looks upon the pact as a direct challenge to his ambitions of leadership of the Sunni Muslim world. The Saudi-Pakistan axis, bolstered by Chinese capital, is a countervailing pole of power to Turkey's own strategic ambitions. Istanbul is unlikely to join a Riyadh-led bloc directly and may instead redouble its partnerships with Qatar and Azerbaijan, setting the stage for a soft competition for influence across the Muslim world.
However, its expected opposition to the Saudi-Pakistan defense agreement over these circumstances will leave unresolved its roles like supplying high-endurance drones to Rawalpindi, such as Bayraktar which proved fatal during the May 2025 war between India and Pakistan.
For Iran, the pact offers both a challenge and an opportunity. Although it diminishes Tehran's options for directly confronting Saudi Arabia, this new axis could potentially drift Iran deeper into an alliance with Russia and China, thereby accelerating the birth of a competing bloc. Ali Larijani, who chairs Iran's Supreme National Security Council, was in Riyadh on September 16 to meet with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.
His visit suggests that Tehran is not abandoning dialogue considering the new agreement. Therefore, Tehran will have to be careful not to overtly reject the Saudi-Pakistan defense pact so as not to provoke regional instability and keep its diplomatic ties balanced against the U S and Israeli influence.
Indonesia is the largest Muslim state in the world, and therefore, under no circumstances can it oppose the SMDA. In July 2025, it expressed a desire to strengthen defence cooperation with Pakistan to find possibilities for cooperation, especially defence production. Furthermore, two years back, Indonesia also invited Saudi Arabia to establish strategic security ties with the Kingdom.
Israel has particular concern that this agreement potentially brings a nuclear-armed Pakistan into the regional equation. With the agreement marking the period in which Israel has extended its offensive against Hamas and its allies to include attacks in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and even on Iranian soil, alongside those in Tunisia, the introduction of a nuclear dimension to Gulf security by Pakistan's arsenal enormously changes Israel's strategic calculations.
Another facet of pivotal importance is the acknowledgment of Palestine by over 150 states, including the UK, France, Canada and Australia, in a serious diplomatic setback for Israel. These developments mirror the increasing international calls for a two-state solution and mounting pressure on Israel to re-evaluate its position to implement such a solution in the region.
King Abdullah II of Jordan, at the UN General Assembly, accused Israel of trying to undermine the prospect of a Palestinian state. He criticized the international community for its failure to act, insisting statehood is a right; France, too, offered its recognition in this regard at the 80th UNGA Session.
Equally, President Prabowo Subianto stated that Indonesia was prepared to send its peacekeepers to Gaza, condemning the "unbearable tragedy" and humanitarian disaster. He reaffirmed his offer with the condition: Indonesia would recognize Israel, the moment Israel recognizes an independent Palestinian state, or what he termed as "the right side of history." The offer extended by Indonesia is supposedly to provide 20,000 peacekeeping forces to Gaza.
In contrast, Trump presented a 21-point Gaza plan to Arab leaders during the UN General Assembly, proposing a ceasefire, hostage releases, and new Gaza governance excluding Hamas. While regional diplomats showed interest, the plan faces immediate obstacles as Netanyahu rejects Palestinian statehood and settlement issues remain unresolved.
The Saudi-Pakistan agreement creates global ripple effects across multiple continents. In Africa, countries like Somalia, Chad, and Libya gain alternative security and investment partners beyond traditional Western allies, while Egypt may diversify its patronage base. For Australia, the pact reinforces multipolar Indo-Pacific challenges to US dominance, adding another partnership network to counter alongside China's influence.
In the Americas, the US faces strategic complications while Canada and Mexico monitor developments given their Pakistani diaspora and Saudi economic ties respectively. South American nations, particularly Argentina's BRICS+ membership, exemplify the broader trend toward diversified global partnerships beyond conventional Western alliances that this Saudi-Pakistan alignment represents.
This global impact needs to be weighed in while considering recent trends. Between 2000 and 2025, the G7's global GDP share declined significantly to 43% while BRICS+ surged to 32%, alternative currency trade doubled from 13% to 22%, and reduced US Middle East troop presence of 40,000-50,000 reflects a fundamental realignment challenging the post-war liberal order where great power competition now overshadows multilateral cooperation on global issues like climate change and the SDGs.
If Middle Eastern shocks take on significant magnitude, affecting South Asia and materialising into a nightmare scenario for India as its primary historical adversary, Pakistan is finally united with a powerful, wealthy partner in Saudi Arabia, the Arab nation that had been very carefully cultivating closer ties with New Delhi.
This agreement comes amidst heightened tensions between India and Pakistan involving a fiery, though brief, confrontation in May 2025, and India’s increasing isolation in the region with neighbours like Bangladesh, Maldives and Nepal pivoting to China.
The Indian security establishment now worries that the pact might embolden Pakistan in its rivalry with India. Indian analysts suggest that the development could speed up New Delhi's defense partnership with Israel, with which it already shares intelligence and advanced weapons cooperation, worrying Tehran and Russia.
The biggest worry for India is that the Pakistan-Saudi Arabia pact solidifies Pakistan's strategic depth to the west, allowing it to focus its military and diplomatic energies eastward, on Kashmir and the Indian frontier.
Internally, the pact offers Islamabad a very powerful tool against the ever-raging Balochistan insurgency, primarily sparked by a governance deficit. Saudi investments and strategic interest in the Gwadar port, a major node of China's Belt and Road Initiative, and the province's minerals provide for a new impetus for the state to crush the rebellion.
The pact's regional impact extends to key neighbors. In Afghanistan, the Taliban rejected US demands for Bagram Air Base access, while strained Pakistan relations may affect the Saudi-Pakistan defense agreement amid broader geopolitical tensions. Meanwhile, Sri Lanka's strategic shipping location has become contested ground between China's Belt and Road Initiative and India's concerns over Beijing's growing regional influence.
During the 80th UNGA session, Donald Trump once again took credit for brokering a ceasefire between India and Pakistan in May 2025, much to India’s discomfiture. Additionally, his reference to his meetings with Pakistan prime minister Shehbaz Sharief, and Pakistan Field Marshall Asim Munir, describing them as ‘great guys’ are being viewed in India with silent resentment.
He had earlier called for reconciliation and dialogue between the two countries. In his address to the UN General Assembly, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif extended a renewed offer for comprehensive dialogue with India. He raised the issues of Kashmir and the Indus Water Treaty, as well as Palestine, demanding their early resolution while making a series of assertions likely to be met with skepticism in New Delhi.
The Pakistani leader’s call for talks contrasts with the anticipated stance of Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, who has stated that India's position is to focus squarely on the imperative for a unified global stand against terrorism, without accommodation or double standards—a clear reference to long-standing grievances with Pakistan. Meanwhile, on the sidelines of the UNGA, diplomatic efforts continue, with Jaishankar scheduled to meet US Secretary of State Antony Blinken.
Turkey, while welcoming the ceasefire, also called for reconciliation on Kashmir, a position strongly rejected by India.
Meanwhile, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation’s (OIC) Kashmir Contact Group, including Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, convened a meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly and reviewed the situation in Jammu and Kashmir, expressing deep concern over what it termed deteriorating human rights conditions and India’s legislative actions since 2019.
The group adopted a joint communique reaffirming support for the Kashmiri people’s right to self-determination, in accordance with UN resolutions. It called on India to end repression and release political prisoners.
New Delhi, however, maintains that the changes in Jammu and Kashmir are an internal matter, aimed at fostering development and governance, and has consistently criticised the OIC for allowing its agenda to be hijacked by Pakistan.
Amidst the global push for reconciliation, India’s woes were further enhanced by the deepening Ladakh crisis involving violent protests and leading to the arrest of climate activist Sonam Wangchuk, the main face of Ladakh’s protest, casting a shadow over upcoming talks between Ladakhi leaders and the Union government.
The global diplomatic heft that Pakistan now enjoys, coupled with the latest deal, would further accelerate the global echoes for reconciliation on Kashmir, and India may find it difficult to navigate these challenges.
The Saudi-Pakistan deal marks a pivotal shift in global power dynamics, linking Riyadh's financial strength with Islamabad's military capabilities to create a new axis from the Gulf to the Himalayas that challenges US hegemony, isolates India, while strengthening China's western flank, and introduces nuclear dimensions to Middle Eastern conflicts between Israel and Iran.
But essentially, this new world will not be calm, but full of risks and wars, where small wars will drag in bigger powers, amidst which major challenges will be side-stepped as the global map is re-drawn.
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