Elections for the Legislative Assembly in Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir (PaJK), the territory Islamabad calls "Azad Jammu and Kashmir", are scheduled for July 25, 2026.
For months, there has been speculation across the region about what position the Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC) would take on these elections. No clear, final, or formal stance emerged.
The Unfolding Developments
At the core committee meeting on February 25, 2026, in Sarsawa, Kotli, where many expected a decisive position, elections went unmentioned in the official statement. The main decision was instead this: if the October 4, 2025, agreement with the committee was not fully implemented, direct action would begin on June 9, 2026, potentially including a shutdown strike, transport blockade, and a long march to Muzaffarabad.
Meanwhile, the PaJK government continued its familiar pattern of delays, vague responses, and open violations of agreed demands, while public frustration among committee supporters kept rising. Pakistani politicians who were party to the Muzaffarabad Agreement and responsible for its implementation made strange and contradictory statements, with some even claiming the Joint Awami Action Committee itself was blocking development in PaJK, a remarkable assertion given the committee was only formed two years ago.
In reality, it was the JAAC movement that, for the first time, forced those in power to be accountable, something they are clearly uncomfortable with.
The Election Commissioner has since been appointed and announced that elections will proceed on July 25, 2026, with a full schedule expected in May. He also stated that elections would be held under military supervision, with additional forces including Pakistani Rangers brought in from Pakistan. In line with this, candidates have begun to emerge in districts like Bagh, Palandri, Kotli, and Mirpur under the Action Committee's banner.
Against this backdrop, the Joint Awami Action Committee held another meeting in Dadyal on March 30–31. Its statement was read publicly on March 31 at Maqbool Bhat Chowk before core members, senior activists, and thousands of anxious citizens.
Implications of Dadyal Charter
Having followed these developments closely and read the statement carefully, I find myself increasingly convinced that a march is more likely than elections.
The committee has placed a set of far-reaching demands on the authorities: an independent Election Commission, new constituency boundaries drawn on population, abolition of reserved seats for Kashmiri refugees in Pakistan, full implementation of the Muzaffarabad Agreement, and an end to what it calls the "unjust privileges" of the elite. All of this must be met by a May 31 deadline.
Realistically, none of this can be achieved within two months unless both the governments of Pakistan and PaJK act on an emergency basis. Even then, serious questions remain. Who would appoint a truly independent Election Commissioner? Can constituencies be redrawn in such a short time? Can refugee seats be abolished before the legal process already underway is completed? And who decides what counts as "unjust" elite privilege?
For the Action Committee, holding elections without these reforms in place would amount to a betrayal of the people. It is, therefore, unlikely that the committee will participate in, or support, elections held under the current system.
This points to a straightforward conclusion: on June 9, there will in all likelihood be a strike and a long march.
Some voices on social media have wrongly claimed that the committee has demanded a constituent assembly. The latest statement says no such thing. What it says is this: if the agreed demands and reform charter are not implemented by May 31, 2026, a historic long march on the Legislative Assembly in Muzaffarabad will take place, accompanied by an indefinite lockdown across PaJK, in pursuit of an empowered assembly. The distinction matters.
The Unmet Promises
Most of these demands are not new. They were accepted in principle long ago but never implemented, and in some cases openly violated. The only genuinely new element is the demand to empower the existing legislative assembly through structural reforms.
This raises a critical question: why are the authorities not implementing these demands?
Are the governments of Pakistan and Azad Kashmir even aligned on this, or is the PPP-led government in PaJK pursuing its own course? The government claims to have implemented 98% of the agreed demands, a figure that is highly questionable.
Of the approximately 41 demands, ordinary people can plainly see that only a handful have been meaningfully addressed. The likely official response will be: "We have done our part; the remaining issues, like refugee seats, and elite privileges, are for committees to resolve." Conveniently, linking these unresolved demands to the elections may actually suit the government, particularly if it has reasons to delay or avoid elections altogether.
Then there is the role of Pakistan's powerful administrative apparatus — the civil bureaucracy, military, and intelligence agencies. What do they want? Do they want genuine reform and stability? Do they benefit from rising instability, which gives them greater justification to intervene and tighten control? Or are they simply focused on ensuring elections happen, regardless of whether any reforms follow?
What Happens Next?
If the long march is blocked — as seems likely — there could be further loss of life. If it reaches Muzaffarabad, which is also possible, what happens next? Some enthusiasts on social media give the impression that the committee will occupy the Legislative Assembly building, but the committee itself has said no such thing. It has called only for a sit-in. The more probable outcome, then, is not a transfer of power but another negotiated agreement with the government and with it, elections postponed until reforms are completed.
This brings us to a broader and more uncomfortable conclusion: there may be another march, and perhaps another agreement, but no elections.
If that is where this leads, then an important question must be asked: has the Action Committee reached the limits of its political strategy? Is this a way of deferring the internal contradiction - whether to enter electoral politics or remain outside it? Is it a step towards transforming an economic protest movement into a political force? Or is it a way of avoiding difficult decisions and hard responsibilities, choosing a path whose destination remains unclear even to those walking it?
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